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Rector Magnificus, esteemed colleagues, dear students, family and
friends, and other guests,
1 Introduction1
When deciding on the topic of my inaugural lecture, I had to make
various difficult choices. Granted, they are not ‘tragic choices’ in the
sense of Calabresi and Bobbitt, where conflicts of value are involved
in deciding on the allocation of scarce economic resources, but still
the choices were difficult.2 And they do involve scarce economic
resources, for example the time you are now spending on listening
to me. I will return to this issue at the end of the lecture.
The first choice I had to make was whether I should focus the
lecture more on family and friends, or more on students and collea-
gues. Because an inaugural lecture is a professional occasion, I have
chosen to focus the lecture more on the latter group. I hope to make
up for my current neglect of family and friends after the lecture.
The second choice was whether I primarily address a legal audi-
ence, or a Law and Economics audience. Given that the chair I am
appointed to is established in the Erasmus School of Law, not the
Erasmus School of Law and Economics, I have chosen to focus this
lecture on a legal audience, but I hope that it also contains interesting
aspects for the Law and Economics public.
Finally, I had to choose the topic. After considering and rejecting
various options, I have chosen to discuss three forms of damages
which are the subject of heated discussions in the Netherlands, hence
the title Debated Damages. Some of the debates have already been
going on for decades, others are of a more recent origin, but they all
share the fact that different views are expressed and a consensus has
not yet been reached. I want to contribute to those debates by
providing a Law and Economics view on those debated damages. It
is not my goal, neither today nor in my future research and teaching,
to fine-tune complicated highly technical mathematical models of
accident law, but rather to apply economic ideas and concepts which
enable policy recommendations to be provided to policy makers.3
1 I would like to thank Michael Faure and Roger Van den Bergh for their valuable comments
on a previous version of this text.
2 Calabresi and Bobbitt 1978.
3 On the tension between the two approaches, see e.g. Ogus 2004; Garoupa and Ulen 2008;
Bishop 2013; Posner and Becker 2015. Bishop quotes Alfred Marshall, generally seen as a
founding father of economics, who writes inter alia: ‘Use mathematics as a short hand
This approach also resonates in the name of the chair I am appointed
to: it is not called Economic Analysis of Tort and Damages Law, but
Legal Economic Analysis of Tort and Damages. Hence, the term ‘legal’,
not ‘economic’ comes first.4
As said, I will discuss three examples of debated damages. The first
topic is pain and suffering damages for personal injuries, the second
is affection damages and the third is mass damages.
The first topic has been the subject of ongoing discussions for
many years. In the Netherlands, the view is often expressed that pain
and suffering damages for personal injuries are too low in general,
but also that damages for major injuries fall even shorter from a
desirable situation than damages for minor injuries. This of course
raises the question of what the proper magnitude for pain and
suffering damages for personal injuries is to start with.
The second topic, affection damages, also has been heavily
debated for many years already and a draft bill regarding compensa-
tion for such damages was rejected by the Senate in 2010. However,
in May 2014 a public consultation was started regarding a new draft
bill which does include affection losses in Article 6:107 and 6:108 of
the Civil Code, hence in cases of grave and permanent injuries or
death. The consultation closed in early August 2014.
The third topic was also the subject of a recent public consulta-
tion, which closed in early October 2014. In the Netherlands, Article
language, rather than as an engine of inquiry. (…) Translate into English. (…) Then illustrate
by examples that are important in real life.’ (Pigou 1925, p. 427). If the theoretical models
lack relevance for the actual legal issues under investigation, they do not form ‘good
economics’ in Bishop’s view and I agree with this. Even more, and Bishop also stresses
this point, such an approach might even result in a situation where the economic analysis
of law becomes less influential and important, because it lacks relevance for the legal
audience. In the words of Bishop (2013, p. 76): ‘It cannot be good news when the economic
debates/arguments leave the non-economist both cold and perplexed.’
4 This point should not be overstressed and is merely intended to express that the chair is
established in the School of Law and that the research undertaken will have a strong focus
on the legal aspects of the topics under investigation. I use ‘Law and Economics’ and
‘Economic Analysis of Law’ as synonyms, but recognize that the analyses can be more
legally oriented or more economically oriented. I therefore do not follow the distinction
Miller (2011) makes between the two terms. He describes ‘the economic analysis of law’ as
the use of economic principles and reasoning to understand legal materials and sees this
as a branch of economics where law is the object of study. In ‘law and economics’, both
disciplines in his view form an ‘equal partnership’ and both contribute to the activity. See
Miller 2011, p. 459, 460.
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3:305a of the Civil Code enables mass litigation, but section 3 of this
article prohibits mass litigation with the object of receiving monetary
compensation. The consultation regards a proposal to lift this prohi-
bition on mass damages litigation.
In this lecture, I will provide my view on these three forms of debated
damages, from an economic perspective. However, before I can dive
into the three topics in Sections 3, 4 and 5 respectively, I will start in
Section 2 with a short general economic description of damage and
damages. This is necessary to understand the economic analysis of
the debated damages in the subsequent sections.
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2 An economic approach to damage
and damages
2.1 Damage and full compensation
According to the ‘difference hypothesis’ of Friedrich Mommsen,
damage or loss is the difference between the wealth of a person as it
is at a given time, and the wealth as it would have been at that time if
the damaging event had not occurred.5 This legal idea of the difference
hypothesis of Mommsen can be beautifully expressed in economic
terms, more specifically by using so-called indifference curves.
An indifference curve represents all combinations of two goods
which an individual finds equally desirable, or in other words, which
yield him the same level of utility. Let us call these two goods ‘A’ and
‘B’ for the time being. Hence, this person is indifferent to all combi-
nations of A and B on the curve. It is often assumed that the extra
utility yielded by an additional unit of a good, decreases the more the
person already has from this good. For example, the first ice cream on
a hot summer day provides much utility, the second already a bit less,
the third even less et cetera. This is called decreasing marginal utility.6
This decreasing marginal utility also holds for wealth: with the first
Euros someone acquires, he will fulfil the most important needs,
such as food, clothing, and housing. Someone who already has a
certain level of wealth which covers those needs, will spend his
additional money on less important things such as nicer clothes, a
holiday et cetera. So the more money one already has, the less
additional utility an additional Euro yields, because it will be spent
on satisfying less important needs.
Figure 1 below represents a set of indifference curves for various
combinations of goods A and B which are characterized by decreas-
ing marginal utility. Curve U1 depicts all combinations of A and B
which result in utility level 1, and curveU2 depicts all combinations of
A and B which result in the – higher – utility level 2. The fact that U2
is located higher than U1 shows that utility level 2 is higher than
utility level 1.
5 In the words of Mommsen (1855, p. 3): ‘Die Differenz zwischen dem betrage des Vermögens,
wie derselbe in einem gegebenen Zeitpunkte ist, und dem Betrage, welchen dieses Vermögen
ohne die Dazwischenkunft eines bestimmten beschädigenden Ereignisses in dem zur Frage
stehenden Zeitpunkte haben würde.’
6 One of my promoters once claimed that this decreasing marginal utility does not hold for
drinking beer.
G
oo
d 
B
Good A
U2
U
0
1
Figure 1. Indifference curves
If a person who is originally located somewhere on U2 loses several
units of good A, his utility level decreases and he now ends up on a
lower indifference curve, e.g. U1. There are several ways of bringing
him back to his original utility level: (1) he receives exactly the
number of units of good A he lost, so that he returns to the original
point on curve U2; (2) he receives a number of units of good B which
bring him back to curve U2, albeit in a different location on that
curve; (3) he receives a combination of A and B bringing him back to
curve U2.
If good B consist of money, the relevance of this line of
reasoning for the law of damages is clear: if due to a tort our victim
loses several units of good A or they become damaged, there are
several ways in which the tortfeasor can compensate the victim: he
replaces or repairs the lost or damaged units of A (so, restoration in
kind), he pays an amount of monetary compensation which yields
the same amount of utility that the lost or damaged units of good A
yielded (so, damages), or a combination of both options (for
example, if repair of good A does not fully restore the victim to
the original position, an additional monetary compensation is
required to offset the decreased value of A). This line of reasoning
is depicted in Figure 2 below.7
7 Also see Cooter and Ulen 2012, p. 190ff.
12 Debated Damages
M
on
ey
Good A
U2
U
0
1
Z
Y X
Figure 2. Damage and damages
Imagine a person who is originally located in point X. Due to the tort
which damaged or destroyed several units of good A he ends up in
point Y. Restoration in kind would bring him back to point X,
whereas full monetary compensation would bring him to point Z.
He is indifferent between both options, because they yield the same
level of utility. Repair plus monetary damages to compensate for a
remaining loss in value of A would bring him to a point on curve U2
between X and Z, which again yields the same utility because it is
located on the same indifference curve.
If good A represents health, in principle the same line of reasoning
can be applied. If a person gets injured due to the tort of someone
else, and if the injuries can be fully cured with medical treatment, the
tortfeasor should cover the medical costs so that the victim returns to
his original position. In cases where, after medical treatment, the
victim still has lost utility due to the accident, additional monetary
compensation is required to bring the victim back to his original
utility level. This is relevant in situations where the treatment does
not fully cure the victim, but also if the victim has experienced pain,
suffering, anxiety et cetera due to the accident. The medical treatment
may restore the physical health, but due to these non-pecuniary losses
the victim is not restored to his original position. I will return to this
issue when discussing pain and suffering damages for personal
injuries.
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Cooter and De Pianto argue that in the case of death or serious
injuries, indifference curves might be incomplete because there
might not be monetary equivalents for these harms. Such harms
are hence ‘incompensable’.8 I will further discuss this issue in
Section 2.2 below.
As said, according to the approach of Mommsen, the legal starting
point is that damages should bring the victim back to the position he
would have reached without the damaging event. From an economic
perspective, ‘full compensation’ implies that the tortfeasor should
bring the victim back to the utility level he would have reached
without the tort.9 This raises the question of why we want the tortfea-
sor to restore the victim’s utility level. A common response of lawyers
to that question is that compensation is a goal in itself, and even the
main goal of tort damages. For example, Bloembergen regards com-
pensation as ‘the central goal’ of the law of damages.10
Without going into a full discussion regarding the goals of tort
damages, some remarks regarding this possible compensation goal
are needed.11 First, if compensation truly is a goal, it is difficult to
understand why tort law focuses so much on the behavior of the
tortfeasor. This is especially clear if a rule of negligence applies: only
if the injurer was not careful enough will he bear the victim’s losses.
From a compensation point of view, this does not make much sense,
because for the mere compensation of the victim’s loss, the injurer’s
behavior is not so important. Second, tort law is not the best instru-
ment to reach a compensation goal. Insurance results in compensa-
tion much quicker and much cheaper than tort law.12
8 Cooter and De Pianto 2013, p. 445. Also see Cooter 2003, p. 1100ff.
9 See e.g. Cooter and De Pianto 2013, p. 442.
10 Bloembergen 1982, p. 2. Lindenbergh states in his revision of Bloembergen’s book that the
goal of the law of damages is to place the victim (in as far as possible) in the position he
would have reached if the tortfeasor had fulfilled his (primary) legal duties, so compensa-
tion. The law of damages in that sense provides an important contribution to the enforce-
ment of rights, which is the aim of tort law. See Bloembergen and Lindenbergh 2008, p. 8ff.
11 On the possible goals of tort law, see (among many others and besides the authors
mentioned in the subsequent footnotes) e.g. Deutsch 1971; Calabresi 1977, p. 24ff; Tunc
1983, p. 87; Priest 1988; Kötz 1990; Spier et al. 2003, p. 7; Engelhard and Van Maanen 2008,
p. 11ff.
12 Also see Calabresi 1977, p. 21, 27; Shavell 1987, p. 263.
14 Debated Damages
Also legal authors in various countries challenge the view that
compensation indeed is a goal of tort law. For example, in the
American handbook Prosser and Keeton on Torts we can read that the
primary function of tort law is not compensation, but to determine
when compensation is to be required.13 The Australian handbook
Fleming’s The Law of Torts states that the law does not compensate
all losses and that shifting is only justified when there is a special
reason.14 The English writer Williams argues that the idea that tort
law aims at compensation does not look below the surface of things.
The real question is why do we wish to compensate?15 And the
German lawyer Kötz writes that tort law decides about awarding
damages, but also about withholding them. Therefore, if one says
the goal of tort law is ‘compensating’, in Kötz’ view one should
equally say its goal is ‘not compensating’.16 In the Netherlands,
comparable views are expressed by, for example, Van Dam, Hartlief
and Nieuwenhuis.17
Following this approach, compensation might better be regarded
as the instrument with which the goals of tort law are pursued.18 In
Law and Economics, the impact of law on social welfare is analysed
and social welfare is often seen as the sum of utility levels of the
members of society.19 This implies that a loss which reduces the
utility level of an individual, in principle lowers social welfare. It is
therefore desirable to avoid these losses, in order to avoid the
decrease in social welfare. However, precautionary measures which
may avoid a loss are not without cost. From an economic point of
view, tort law aims at minimizing the sum of care costs and expected
13 Keeton et al. 1984, p. 20.
14 Fleming 1992, p. 3.
15 Williams 1951, p. 137. He writes: ‘An intelligent approach to the study of law must take
account of its purpose, and must be prepared to test the law critically in the light of its
purpose.’
16 Kötz 2001, p. 17.
17 Van Dam 1989, p. 213; 226ff; Hartlief 1997, p. 17-21; Nieuwenhuis 1997, p. 13, 18, 19;
Hartlief 2004, p. 7.
18 Also see e.g. Posner 2003, p. 192. Owen labels compensation a ‘function’ of tort law. It
cannot be a goal because compensation is only appropriate when liability is appropriate
and the reasons why liability is deemed appropriate in certain circumstances form the true
goals. See Owen 1985, p. 666.
19 See e.g. Arlen 2000, p. 683; Posner 2003, p. 24ff; Shavell 2004, p. 2; Schäfer and Ott 2004,
p. 47.
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accident losses, thereby weighing the costs and benefits of care.20
This is often called the prevention goal of tort law: it is desirable that
people take precautionary measures as long as the reduction in
expected accident losses caused by these measures outweighs their
costs. Therefore, not all losses are avoided, because that would be too
expensive. So, tort law, in this view, should not aim at maximum care
andminimum expected accident losses, but at optimal levels where the
marginal costs of care are weighed against the marginal benefits.
Losses that are too expensive to avoid, should subsequently be spread
optimally over society. After all, due to the decreasing marginal utility
of wealth, concentrated losses cost more utility than spread losses: if
one person suffers a large financial loss, this might endanger also his
ability to satisfy more urgent needs, but if more people each only
suffer a small loss, this only harms the fulfilment of their least
important needs. Finally, the system costs should be included in
the analysis, because the costs of the legal system should not out-
weigh the benefits in the sense of better prevention and loss
spreading.
Hence, in the economic analysis of tort law, prevention and loss
spreading are regarded as the goals, and compensation is the instru-
ment to reach those goals. This also clarifies the ‘division of labor’
between the law of torts and the law of damages: the law of torts
determines which party in which circumstances will receive a beha-
vioral incentive from the legal system, and the law of damages
determines how large that incentive will be. In principle this eco-
nomic approach implies that tort damages should be full: only if the
full decrease in utility experienced by the victim is weighed against
the full costs of precautionary measures, will the economically
desirable actions be chosen.21
2.2 Pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses
2.2.1 Introduction
In case of a pecuniary loss, the victim loses money or replaceable
goods. Arlen defines a commodity as replaceable if its owner believes
that equivalent commodities are available on the market. Full
20 See e.g. Calabresi 1977, p. 24ff; Shavell 1987, p. 7; Posner 2003, p. 167ff; Shavell 2004,
p. 175.
21 See e.g. Faure 2000, p. 148ff. For the exceptions, see e.g. Arlen 2000, p. 682; Visscher
2009, p. 156ff.
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compensation in the case of the loss of replaceable goods means
receiving the market price, because that enables the victim to buy a
perfect substitute.22 In the case of a non-pecuniary loss however, non-
replaceable ‘goods’ such as for example family portraits, but also
health or emotional well-being are lost or damaged.23 Both types of
losses result in a loss of utility. Hence, in order to give the correct
behavioral incentives to the actors involved, both types of losses
should in principle be included in tort damages. The so-called
prevention theory therefore argues that non-pecuniary losses have to
be included in tort damages.24
Cooter and Ulen argue that the idea of perfect compensation,
meaning that the amount of compensation brings the victim back
to the same utility level he had before the accident, is ‘the right goal
for courts trying to internalize costs, but implementing the goal is
difficult for intangible, but real, harms’.25 It is not possible to observe
and measure this subjective loss, and it is certainly possible that no
amount of compensation will make the victim truly indifferent
between not suffering the loss on the one hand, and suffering the
loss but receiving compensation on the other hand. Given that there
is no market for these non-replaceable goods, there is also no market
price available which could be used as a basis to assess damages. We
therefore need an indirect way to assess them.26 I will discuss two
indirect methods below.
2.2.2 Insurance theory
One indirect way of assessing such losses is by analyzing how much
money people are willing to spend on insurance against such
losses.27 This approach is labelled the insurance theory. The line of
reasoning is as follows: If people do not want to buy insurance against
immaterial losses because they find the premium too high, tort law
should not force such coverage upon them.28 This especially holds in
situations where these people would in fact pay for this coverage
22 Arlen 2000, p. 683.
23 Shavell 1987, p. 133; Arlen 2000, p. 697ff; Shavell 2004, p. 242.
24 Adams 1989, p. 213ff; Ott and Schäfer 1990, p. 566; Arlen 2000, p. 702; Shavell 2004,
p. 242; Cooter and Ulen 2012, p. 253ff.
25 Cooter and Ulen 2012, p. 192.
26 Also see Cooter and De Pianto 2013, p. 439ff.
27 See e.g. Ott and Schäfer 1990, p. 566.
28 Shavell 1987, p. 228ff; Adams 1989, p. 216ff; Ott and Schäfer 1990, p. 568; Pryor 1993, p. 101
ff; Shavell 2004, p. 269ff.
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because the price of the products, services or activities involved
increases as a result of potential liability.29 Tort damages are in this
line of reasoning regarded as a possible way to cover losses and hence
they serve a similar goal as insurance, for which the person who
receives the cover pays a price.30
Based on the idea of decreasing marginal utility of wealth, it is
argued that people do want to buy insurance against pecuniary losses,
but not against non-pecuniary losses. If someone suffers a pecuniary
loss, he loses wealth and after the accident has less wealth than before
the accident. Therefore, money has become worth more to him after
the accident (it has a higher marginal utility). This is an economic
explanation of why people take insurance against pecuniary losses:
before the accident they spend money with a relative low marginal
utility on the insurance premium and after the accident they receive
money from the insurance which by then has a relatively high mar-
ginal utility. In other words, they transfer money from a state of the
world where they need money less (the paid premium before
the accident), to a state of the world where they need money more
(the coverage after the accident). The utility they lose because they
have to pay the insurance premium is lower than the expected utility
of receiving coverage in case they indeed suffer the pecuniary loss.
Insurance hence allows people to distribute resources across different
states of the world (before and after an accident), which enables them
to improve their situation.31
With non-pecuniary losses, people do not lose wealth, but they
suffer an immaterial loss irrespective of their wealth. Danzon
explains that optimal compensation is higher if the accident increases
the marginal utility of wealth (as is the case with pecuniary losses)
and lower if it decreases it. Whether personal injuries affect marginal
utility of wealth in her opinion cannot be determined theoretically,
but an investigation of whether coverage against non-pecuniary losses
is in practice included in private and public insurance leads her to the
conclusion that full coverage of all losses (so also non-pecuniary
losses) ‘far exceeds the coverage people are prepared to pay for, given
the choice’.32
29 For example, if product liability also encompasses non-pecuniary losses, product prices
may be higher than if liability only covers pecuniary losses.
30 Rubin and Calfee 1992, p. 250; Arlen 1993, p. 117; Geistfeld 1995, p. 793ff; King 2004, p. 184.
31 Croley and Hanson 1995, p. 1822.
32 Danzon 1985, p. 550ff. Also see Croley and Hanson 1995, p. 1801.
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Many proponents of the insurance theory argue that non-pecuni-
ary losses do not increase the marginal utility of wealth of victims,
because their wealth has not changed.33 It is even argued that acci-
dents in which people suffer permanent injuries decrease the mar-
ginal utility of money because the victims may lose ways in which
they can spend their money. If they now spend their money on a
different activity than before the accident, this activity must yield less
utility than the previous one. Otherwise they would have already
chosen this activity before the accident.34 Empirical research seems
to corroborate the view that injuries reduce the marginal utility of
wealth.35
Hence, according to the insurance theory, people are not willing
to buy insurance against non-pecuniary losses, because such losses
do not increase, or may even decrease, the marginal utility of wealth.
The insurance coverage they expect to receive after the accident would
have a lower marginal utility than the money they have spent on the
premium. Such insurance would therefore actually decrease their
expected utility, because the premium costs more utility than the
expected coverage yields. The fact that in practice there is no demand
for such insurance is regarded as corroboration of this line of
reasoning. This in turn implies that tort damages should not include
such losses, because the loss of utility arising from the increase in the
price of products, services et cetera would outweigh the utility
received by the expected coverage.
The insurance theory has been criticized on various grounds. First,
even if the argument that marginal utility of wealth does not increase
as a result of the non-pecuniary loss is correct, the overall utility level
of the victim decreases and he might want to take out insurance
because the money received after suffering the non-pecuniary loss
may again increase the overall utility level to a certain extent.36
Second, this so-called ‘baseline utility’might have an effect on the
marginal utility of wealth as well. Croley and Hanson provide the
following example: when a person is deciding to which of two friends
33 Also see Cook and Graham 1977, p. 146ff.
34 Friedman 1982, p. 82.
35 Sloan et al. 1998, p. 489ff; Viscusi and Evans 1990, p. 371; Evans and Viscusi 1991, p. 102ff.
36 Croley and Hanson 1995, p. 1827ff.
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to give an opera ticket, the friend who enjoys opera more in principle
will derive more utility from the ticket. However, if the other friend
has a difficult period in his life, an evening out (whether it is the
opera or something else) might give him much utility, given that his
baseline currently is so low. Therefore, it could be the case that the
second friend derives more utility from the ticket, even though the
first friend likes opera more.37
Third, the fact that there is no demand for insurance against non-
pecuniary losses may be caused by imperfect information regarding
the extent of non-pecuniary losses, the probability of their occurrence
and the compensation required in respect of them, or by counter-
vailing social norms in the form of societal hostility to putting a price
on pain and sorrow and legal restrictions such as the indemnity
principle.38 In addition, there may be problems on the supply side
of the insurance market. It might, for example, be very difficult for
insurers to tackle adverse selection and/or moral hazard in the area of
non-pecuniary losses. This could result in a situation where there is
demand for such insurances, but no supply.39 And, obviously,
demand for insurance against non-pecuniary losses might also be
limited or non-existent exactly because such losses are included in
tort damages, so that they are already (partially) covered. This might
explain why Danzon finds a low take-up of insurance: people adjust
their decisions to the existing law.40
Finally, the empirical research that corroborates the conclusion
that marginal utility of money does not increase or may even decrease
after suffering non-pecuniary losses, asks healthy people to imagine
that they suffer an accident with permanent injuries. Pryor doubts
whether healthy people can provide accurate statements about mar-
ginal utility of money after a disability and argues that this will lead to
an under-estimation of marginal utility.41
2.2.3 Ex ante care measures
Above it became clear that according to the insurance theory, tort
damages should not encompass non-pecuniary losses because people
37 Idem, p. 1815.
38 Idem, p. 1845ff.
39 Bovbjerg, Sloan and Blumstein 1989, p. 934.
40 Avraham 2005, p. 947ff; Avraham 2006, p. 89.
41 Pryor 1993, p. 116ff.
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do not want to pay for such coverage. According to the prevention
theory, however, the tortfeasor should pay for such losses in order to
provide him with the correct incentives. In the literature, decoupling
liability is sometimes suggested as a solution to this problem. Under
decoupled liability the injurer pays an amount reflecting all the losses
he has caused, while the victim only receives an amount equivalent to
what he would have spent for insurance coverage. The difference
between the two amounts is collected by the state in the form of
a fine.42
In my view, this is not a good solution. First, in cases where the
victim might be facing a higher price for a product or service due to
tort coverage of non-pecuniary losses while he would not want to self-
insure against them, decoupling still results in higher prices (because
the tortfeasor has to pay for non-pecuniary losses) but now the victim
would not receive any compensation for them. In a sense, this is the
worst of two worlds: paying a pseudo-premium (the increased price),
but not receiving coverage. Of course, if the damages paid by the
injurers could ex ante be distributed over all potential victims, this
problem would not occur. However, such a system might not be
feasible in practice.
Second, in the many accident situations where there is no prior
relationship between tortfeasor and victim, the victim is not con-
fronted with a higher price to start with, so that this whole line of
reasoning is irrelevant. Geistfeld, however, explains that in activities
where an actor could be either an injurer or a victim (e.g. traffic
accidents), expanded tort coverage is not free: in the case where our
actor would become a victim, he will receivemore damages, but in the
case he would become an injurer, he would have to pay more
damages. This leads Geistfeld to the conclusion that damages should
be based on the ex ante willingness to pay to avoid losses.43 I will
explain that idea in more detail below.
As said before, given that non-pecuniary losses do not have a market
value and cannot be measured directly, we need an indirect way of
assessing them. The insurance theory uses the insurance decision
regarding non-pecuniary losses as such an indirect assessment
42 See Arlen 2000, 706ff. For an overview of more literature, see Karapanou 2014, p. 61.
43 Geistfeld 1995, p. 804ff and p. 826ff.
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method. It has become clear that there is much discussion about the
question whether rational individuals would indeed want to take out
insurance against such losses, and empirical research does not give a
definite answer.
However, even if the insurance theory would be correct in arguing
that people do not want to self-insure against non-pecuniary losses
because marginal utility of wealth does not increase after an accident,
this in my view should not lead to the conclusion that victims should
not receive compensation for such losses. Besides the point that
excluding non-pecuniary losses from tort damages might weaken
the incentives of potential tortfeasors to take optimal care and activity
decisions, insurance decisions of potential victims provide informa-
tion on their degree of risk aversion but not on how they experience
the potential loss. I therefore think that the insurance theory is asking
the wrong question.
In my view it is better to assess whether the potential victim was
willing to spend resources on taking accident avoidance measures ex
ante, so before any accident.44 That would imply that such losses,
according to his own assessment, do lower his utility level, because he
is willing to spend resources on trying to avoid them. The resources
the victim would be willing to spend provide information on how the
victim himself assesses the non-pecuniary loss. The victim is willing
to forego (the utility derived from) a certain amount of wealth, in
exchange for avoiding suffering the non-pecuniary loss, or at least
reducing the probability of its occurrence. This weighing of foregone
wealth and avoiding non-pecuniary losses, in my view, forms a better
basis for assessing non-pecuniary damages than the insurance
decision (which, again, regards risk aversion rather than loss
assessment).
Let me give an example. The largest immaterial loss I can
imagine is if something were to happen to my wife or children.
Still, I have not taken out life insurance on their lives, which would
yield me an amount of money if they die. But I do take many costly
measures which lower the probability of such events. Take my
children as an example. I bought child safety seats (which were
quite expensive) to use in the car for all three of my children; I even
44 See e.g. Danzon 1984, p. 526; Miller 1989; Ott and Schäfer 1990, p. 568; Rubin and Calfee
1992, p. 249; Geistfeld 1995, p. 825; Cooter and De Pianto 2013, p. 447.
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had to buy a bigger car to fit these child seats; I pay for my
children’s swimming lessons (both in money and in the time I
spend at the side of the pool); I installed secured electricity sockets
in their rooms, et cetera.
Analyzing how many resources people are willing to spend on
care measures in order to avoid suffering non-pecuniary losses gives
an idea of how much utility such non-pecuniary losses would cost: the
same as the money spent on these care measures would have
yielded.45 This can be labelled the victim’s ex ante willingness to
pay to avoid the non-pecuniary loss. In my view, this ex ante willing-
ness to pay forms a good basis to determine tort damages for non-
pecuniary losses, because it shows how many resources the victim
found equivalent (ex ante) to suffering the loss.46
This idea can be shown with the help of Figure 3 below.47 Wealth
is represented on the horizontal axis and the utility it yields on the
vertical axis. More wealth yields more utility but at a decreasing rate,
due to the decreasing marginal utility of wealth. Imagine a person
who finds himself in situation A, with a wealth of e20,000 and a
corresponding utility level of 900. If this person suffers a non-
pecuniary loss, he does not lose wealth, but he loses utility in a direct
way. This can be represented by a downward shift of the utility curve,
bringing our victim to point B with a wealth still of e20,000 but now
with a utility level of 720.48 He therefore has lost 180 units of utility
due to the non-pecuniary losses.
45 For care measures that do not necessarily avoid the loss but ‘merely’ lower the probability
of such losses occurring, the measures express the willingness to pay to reduce the risk.
The reduction in probability has to be incorporated when assessing damages. This is
explained in more detail below, in the text following footnote 51.
46 Of course it might be difficult to measure this willingness to pay, and/or to distinguish the
willingness to pay to avoid pecuniary, as opposed to non-pecuniary losses. I will return to
that issue below.
47 Also see Calfee and Rubin 1992, p. 371, 376.
48 Note that in Figure 3 the utility curve keeps the same form and is merely shifted
downward. This reflects the argument of the insurance theory that marginal utility of
wealth does not increase due to a non-pecuniary loss, which in this Section is assumed
to be correct for the sake of argument. If marginal utility of wealth decreased, the curve
would become flatter, and if it increased the curve would become steeper. This in itself
does not change the line of reasoning of the current Section, which focuses on the ex
ante willingness to pay to avoid the loss, and not on the marginal utility of wealth.
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Figure 3. Ex ante willingness to pay
The important thing to note is that this decrease in utility due to the
non-pecuniary loss in this example is the same as when the victim
would not have suffered the non-pecuniary loss, but would have lost
e8,000 instead. He then would have ended up at point C on his
original utility curve, with a wealth of e12,000 and a corresponding
utility level of 720. This implies that our victim is indifferent
between suffering the non-pecuniary loss on the one hand, and
losing e8,000 while not suffering the non-pecuniary loss on the
other hand. Hence, he would have been willing to spend up to
e8,000 on care measures which would have avoided the non-pecuni-
ary loss. This e8,000 represents his ex ante willingness to pay to
avoid the loss. By basing non-pecuniary damages on this amount of
e8,000, we give incentives to a potential tortfeasor to take care
measures which cost less than e8,000. That is exactly what we want
him to do, because he then makes a correct weighing between the
costs of care on the one hand, and the losses which can be avoided
with those measures on the other hand.
Figure 3 also shows that non-pecuniary damages do not make the
victim indifferent ex post. Receiving an amount of e8,000 after
having suffered the non-pecuniary losses does not return our victim
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to his original utility level. In Figure 3 the non-pecuniary losses are
even of such a magnitude that no amount of damages can fully
compensate the victim: the lower utility curve never reaches the
original utility level of 900. Hence, non-pecuniary losses can be such
that no amount of damages can truly compensate the loss ex post
because the original utility level will not be reached anymore. Still,
there is an ex ante willingness to pay to avoid the loss, which in my
view forms the proper basis for non-pecuniary damages.
If the downward shift of the utility curve had been less severe
than in Figure 3, ex post compensation could have brought the
victim back to his original utility level of 900. However, such ex
post compensation always exceeds the ex ante willingness to pay.
For example, with a non-pecuniary loss where the ex ante will-
ingness to pay to avoid that loss would have been e5,000, ex post
damages which would bring the victim back to his original utility
level would have amounted to e7,000.49 The victim’s ex ante
willingness to pay e5,000 shows that he himself assesses the
non-pecuniary loss at e5,000. This implies that in the weighing
of costs and benefits of care measures, this non-pecuniary loss
should count for e5,000. If it is assessed at a lower amount, the
behavioral incentives would be inadequate and if it is assessed at
a higher amount, they would be excessive. If tort damages are
based on the ex post line of reasoning, they would amount to
e7,000. We would then incentivize a potential tortfeasor to
spend up to e7,000 on care measures, while the victim himself
assessed his loss at e5,000. Hence, ex post damages lead to over-
deterrence so that the ex ante measure in my view is better. In
contrast to what the insurance theory argues, the ex ante measure
does not result in over-compensation or over-deterrence, because
it compensates the victim exactly for the amount he would have
been willing to pay himself. This line of reasoning in my view
nicely fits the statement of Posner in the case Kwasny v. United
States: ‘No one likes pain and suffering and most people would
pay a good deal of money to be free of them. If they were not
recoverable in damages the cost of negligence would be less to
49 This is not shown in Figure 3, but could easily be seen in a figure with a smaller downward
shift of the utility curve.
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the tortfeasors and there would be more negligence, more acci-
dents, more pain and suffering and hence higher social costs.’50
Figure 3 assumes an ex ante care measure which can avoid the loss
with certainty, and assesses the damages for this non-pecuniary loss
at the costs of this ex ante measure. In practice there will be many
situations where the care measure does not avoid the loss with
certainty, but ‘merely’ reduces the probability of such losses occur-
ring. The car seats, swimming lessons and electricity sockets men-
tioned above are examples of this.
A similar line of reasoning applies in such situations, but one has
to incorporate the fact that it regards probabilities rather than cer-
tainty.51 For example, if a potential victim would be willing to spend
up to e100 on a care measure which lowers the probability of a
certain non-pecuniary loss occurring by 1‰, one can argue that the
potential victim assesses this loss at e100,000. After all, if he
assessed it higher he would have been willing to spend more on this
care measure, and if he assessed it lower, he would have been willing
to spend less. Or, put differently, if a thousand potential victims each
spend e100 for a 1‰ reduction in the probability of suffering this
non-pecuniary loss, in total e 100,000 is spent and one accident in
which the loss would occur, is prevented.52 Hence, in order to use the
ex ante willingness to pay to reduce the probability of suffering non-
pecuniary losses as a basis to assess damages for such losses, one has
to divide the amount by the reduction in this probability.
The ex ante willingness to pay is not easily observable, and it may
differ per person, for example because one victim is wealthier than
another victim.53 However, it is important to realize that tort
damages, from an economic perspective, do not necessarily have to
be assessed correctly in each and every individual case. It is question-
able whether a precise calculation of non-pecuniary losses is possible
50 823 f2d 194 Kwasny v. United States (7th Cir. 1987).
51 See Friedman 1982, p. 85ff; Danzon 1984, p. 526; Ott and Schäfer 1990, p. 568; Rubin and
Calfee 1992, p. 249; Geistfeld 1995, p. 825; Cooter 2003, p. 1112ff; Schäfer and Ott 2004,
p. 246; Cooter and Ulen 2012, p. 253ff; Cooter and De Pianto 2013, p. 453ff. Note that
Cooter does not use the victim’s willingness to pay as a basis for his calculations, but one
or more care measures which in society are regarded as reasonable care measures.
52 A similar line of reasoning is used with the concept of the Value of a Statistical Life. See
Section 4.3 below for a more detailed discussion.
53 Also see Avraham 2006, p. 107ff.
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in the first place. But more importantly, economically speaking it is
only required that the losses are assessed correctly on average, because
a potential tortfeasor ex ante will not know the exact loss he will cause.
Structural under-compensation or structural over-compensation
should be avoided, but accuracy in all individual cases is not
required.54 This idea perfectly fits the assessment of pain and suffer-
ing damages in the Netherlands, because the Supreme Court has
stated that in this assessment courts have to abstract from the con-
crete experience and have to assess the loss in a more objective
sense.55
The conclusion of this Section is that we should be looking for an
average ex ante willingness to pay to avoid non-pecuniary losses.
Individual values, which would be difficult if not impossible to find,
are not necessary. The focus should not be on finding damages which
make the victim indifferent ex post. First, no such amount might
exist in the first place because no amount of money might be able to
offset the loss. Second, even if there was an amount which makes the
victim indifferent ex post, this amount would always exceed the
victim’s willingness to spend resources on accident avoidance mea-
sures and hence result in over-compensation and over-deterrence.
54 Kaplow 1994, p. 313ff; Kaplow and Shavell 1996a, p. 194.
55 Hoge Raad 20 September 2004, NJ 2004, p. 112. The Supreme Court writes in Section 3.5:
‘De wijze waarop en de intensiteit waarmee het derven van levensvreugde door de benadeelde is
of zal worden beleefd, zullen in rechte vaak niet, of niet anders dan zeer globaal, kunnen worden
vastgesteld, zodat bij de begroting van het nadeel zal moeten worden geabstraheerd van de
concrete beleving en in meer objectieve zin moet worden vastgesteld in welke mate van nadeel
als hier bedoeld sprake is geweest.’ [The way in which and the intensity with which forgone joy
of life is experienced by the victim cannot, or else only in very general terms, be determined
so that in assessing the losses one has to abstract from the concrete experience and one
has to assess in more objective sense to what extent losses as referred to here have
occurred.]
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3 Pain and suffering damages for personal
injuries
3.1 Introduction
When reading the Dutch legal literature on pain and suffering
damages for personal injuries, it becomes clear that there is much
dissatisfaction regarding the magnitude of these damages in the
Netherlands. They are generally regarded as too low.56 It is further-
more suggested that the amounts awarded for more serious injuries
fall even shorter of the desired magnitude as compared to those for
minor injuries. Lindenbergh argues that the level of compensation
seems to stagnate in the Netherlands, while in the surrounding
countries the amounts increase.57 De Bosch Kemper explains that
the fact that the Supreme Court has instructed courts to pay attention
to the maximum amounts awarded in the Netherlands, slows down
developments in the magnitude of damages.58 Hartlief even wonders
if the developments in the Netherlands are enough to compensate for
inflation. He argues that an increase in the amounts of pain and
suffering damages is needed and that there is no justification for
departing from the European trend.59 Van Dam and Frenk state that
the Supreme Court could, just as is done in e.g. Germany and
England, require that pain and suffering damages should reflect
developments in society.60 Many other legal scholars share these
opinions.
The mere fact that pain and suffering damages in the Netherlands
are lower than in other countries in my view does not in itself tell us
much about the ‘correctness’ of the amounts. The amounts in the
other countries could be too high, rather than the Dutch amounts too
low. Furthermore, many differences between jurisdictions can
impact upon the correct magnitude of pain and suffering damages,
such as the general standard of living and price level, the extent to
which social security and other provisions already help the victim in
coping with his loss, diverging social norms and the question
56 Besides the literature briefly mentioned below, also see e.g. Lindenbergh 1998, p. 273;
Woordkramer 2000, p. 293; Wissink and Van Boom 2001, p. 159; Lindenbergh 2008, p. 75,
76; Verburg 2009, p. 8 and p. 127ff; Van Dam 2013, p. 262ff; Frenk 2013, p. 251.
57 Lindenbergh 2006, p. 6 and 11.
58 De Bosch Kemper 2009, p. 7.
59 Hartlief 2012, p. 8; Hartlief 2014b, p. 2287.
60 Frenk and Van Dam 2012, p. 2819ff.
whether legal expenses have to be covered by the damages as well.61
Therefore, rather than comparing amounts between countries, it is
necessary to search for an external standard to assess the ‘correctness’
of the damages amounts. I will argue today, as I have done previously,
also together with Vaia Karapanou,62 that health economics can
provide such a framework.
3.2 Difficulties in assessing pain and suffering damages
Non-pecuniary losses do not consist in a loss of wealth in the mon-
etary sense of the word, but in a loss of ‘something else’. Article 6:95
of the Dutch Civil Code describes this as ‘any other prejudice’ than
loss to property, rights and interests.63 Article 6:97 requires the court
to assess the damage in a manner most appropriate to its nature, and
where the extent of the damage cannot be determined precisely, it
shall be estimated. Non-pecuniary losses in personal injury situations
are typically losses which cannot be determined precisely, so that a
method for estimation is required.64
In the Netherlands, pain and suffering damages are assessed with
the help of the ANWB Smartengeldboek, by looking at awarded
damages in comparable cases.65 The Supreme Court has instructed
lower courts to pay attention to the amounts that have been previously
awarded, as well as to the highest awarded amounts in the Nether-
lands.66 As said, especially this latter instruction is regarded as a
barrier for increasing pain and suffering damages.
In Germany, pain and suffering damages are also assessed with
reference to previous cases, but courts still enjoy substantial discre-
tion.67 In Italy these damages are assessed by using tables, which
61 Sugarman 2006, p. 410ff states that when comparing pain and suffering damages between
countries, one has to incorporate the general wealth level (Greece and Portugal score
relatively low, which could be caused by a lower standard of living) but also the system of
social security (many Scandinavian countries also score low, which could be caused by the
extensive social security). Hartlief rightfully argues that such factors cannot justify the
de facto decrease in pain and suffering damages in the Netherlands (due to a lack of
compensation of inflation) and the departure from the trend in Europe.
62 See e.g. Karapanou and Visscher 2010.
63 For the English translation of the Dutch articles, use is made of Warendorf, Thomas and
Curry-Sumner 2013.
64 Also see Verburg 2009, p. 4 and p. 23.
65 ANWB 2015.
66 See e.g. De Bosch Kemper 2009, p. 7.
67 Markesinis et al. 2005, p. 65ff.
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may differ between courts. These tables relate to the seriousness of
the injuries expressed in invalidity points.68 In Belgium so-called
‘indicative tables’, composed by the judiciary, are used in which the
personal, domestic and economic impact of injuries are expressed in
monetary terms and in which specific issues such as pain and
esthetic losses are also included.69 In France, permanent injuries
are expressed as a percentage of full incapacity and this percentage
is subsequently multiplied by an amount which depends on the
percentage and on the age of the victim. Here, as in Italy, different
courts may use different tables. For temporary injuries, other tables
are used.
The use of tables and schedules may have the desirable outcome that
comparable cases result in comparable amounts of pain and suffering
damages, although the fact that in France and Italy different courts
use different tables may shed some doubt on this issue. However,
this ‘equal treatment’ in itself does not necessarily mean that the
resulting amounts are correct, because a critical question remains
unanswered: how were the amounts used in the tables and the
original amounts in earlier case law determined? The amounts may
be too low or too high, across the board, and it could also be that some
types of injuries are over- or under-compensated as compared to
other types of injuries. This is a complaint which, as already men-
tioned, is indeed expressed in the Netherlands, where allegedly major
injuries are under-compensated as compared to minor injuries.
In order to tackle these two issues, i.e. the question if pain and
suffering damages in general are too low or too high and the question
if some injuries are over- or under-compensated vis-à-vis other inju-
ries, one needs a framework of analysis which provides a benchmark
for the ‘correctness’ of pain and suffering damages. In my opinion,
law itself cannot provide this framework, and I will argue that eco-
nomics can be of help here.
As became clear above, from an economic perspective we seek a
way to express the impact of immaterial losses on the utility level of
victims in general terms, which is consistent with the instructions of
the Dutch Supreme Court.70 Hence, we are looking for an objective
68 Markesinis et al. 2005, p. 84ff.
69 See e.g. www.ordeexpress.be/UserFiles/ArtikelDocumenten/Indicatieve_tabel_2012.pdf.
70 See footnote 55.
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expression of the average willingness to pay to avoid personal injuries
and this willingness to pay should reflect the immaterial aspects of
the injuries. These aspects in essence boil down to a forgone joy of
life, which again fits the view of the Dutch Supreme Court.71 In my
view, health economics can offer such an expression of the average
willingness to pay to avoid a reduction in the quality of life due to
personal injuries: the concept of the Quality Adjusted Life Years, in
short QALYs.
3.3 Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs)
QALYs are a concept from the field of health economics. They are
used to evaluate health programs, medical treatments and techni-
ques.72 QALYs are an instrument which helps to decide how the
health care budget is spent, and they form a state-of-the-art techni-
que.73 In such decisions, one evaluates whether, for example, a
certain treatment, medicine, surgery, or preventive program yields
enough benefits to be worth its costs. In this sense, QALYs can be
regarded as a way to assess the collective willingness to pay to avoid
certain health conditions or to cure them.
In my view, QALYs can help in better assessing pain and suffer-
ing damages. The basic idea is straightforward: assume that a society
is willing to spend an amount of e10,000 on avoiding a certain
health condition because of its impact on the quality of life of the
person involved. If someone due to an accident suffers from exactly
this health condition, the impact on the quality of life could be
expressed in monetary terms as being on average at least e10,000.
If pain and suffering damages were based on this amount, they would
reflect the decrease in quality of life of the victim, expressed in
objective, average terms. This would be a desirable situation from
the point of view of compensation (because damages are then, as far
as possible, based on the actual loss), from the point of view of
prevention (actors receive incentives to take care measures which
cost less than the loss which would occur in the case of an accident),
and also from the point of view of satisfaction (by basing the damages
on the actual impact of the injuries, one can better acknowledge the
sorrow of the victim).
71 Idem.
72 Brazier et al. 1999, p. 3ff; Dolan 2000; Folland, Goodman and Stano 2007, p. 81.
73 Hofstetter and Hammitt 2001; Dix Smith, Drummond and Brixner 2009, S1-S4.
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A QALY is a measure of the value of living one year in a certain
health condition, and it is used as a proxy for the quality of life during
that year. It expresses this quality with a number (the QALY-weight)
which varies from 0.00 (death) to 1.00 (perfect health), although
sometimes also negative numbers are used to indicate conditions
which are regarded as worse than death. Hence, every health
condition can be expressed by a corresponding QALY-weight.
The impact of a health condition, or the impact of a treatment, can
be expressed in QALY terms. If, for example, a person suffering from
a health condition has a QALY-level of 0.7 and a possible treatment
increases this level to 0.8 during six years, the total QALY-gain would
be 0.6 (six times 0.1). If an alternative treatment increases the QALY-
level to 0.85 but only during three years, the total QALY-gain of that
second treatment would be 0.45 (three times 0.15). The first treat-
ment therefore yields more QALYs than the second and from that
perspective might be regarded as ‘better’.74 In case of an injury or
illness, multiplication of the decrease in QALY-weight caused by this
health condition with the duration of this condition (i.e. by 0.5 if the
condition lasts for six months and by two if it lasts for two years)
yields the total QALY loss caused by the condition.
Different methods for establishing the QALY weights exist.75 In the
standard gamble method, people are asked to choose between living in
a certain health condition on the one hand, and undergoing treat-
ment which, with varying probabilities, leads to either perfect health
or death on the other hand. The lowest probability of living in perfect
health which respondents find high enough to undergo the treatment
determines the QALY weight of the health condition. For example, if
respondents find a 75% chance of success high enough to undergo
the treatment, the QALY-weight of the health condition is 0.75.
In the time trade-off method, people are asked to trade off a number
of years in perfect health against a number of years with a certain
health condition. The ratio between the two determines the QALY
weight, so the more life-years the respondent is willing to forego in
order to achieve perfect health, the lower the QALY weight for the
particular health condition is. For example, if respondents find ten
74 Whether the latter treatment should be preferred over the former obviously also depends
on the costs of both treatments.
75 See e.g. Nord 1992, p. 561ff; Johannesson, Jönsson and Karlsson 1996, p. 283ff; Bleichrodt
and Johannesson 1997, p. 155ff; Brazier et al. 1999, p. 23ff; Dolan 2000, p. 1733ff; Hammitt
2002, p. 994-996.
Pain and suffering damages for personal injuries 33
years in perfect health equivalent to fifteen years with the health
condition, the QALY-weight is 0.67 (10/15).
In the person trade-off, respondents are asked to choose between
improving the health or extending the life expectancy of a group of
people in the first (better) condition and a group of people in the
second (worse) condition. The ratio between these two groups deter-
mines the relative QALY weight of both conditions.
In the visual analogue scale, respondents rank the condition on a
line with concrete endpoints ranging from 0 to 100 where 0 repre-
sents death (or the worst imaginable health condition) and 100
represents perfect health (or the best imaginable health condition).
Another type of method, the so-called ‘generic measures’, asks
respondents to fill out a questionnaire regarding various aspects
which might or might not be affected by the health condition. For
example, the EuroQoL EQ-5D questionnaire uses five dimensions:
mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort and anxiety/
depression. Respondents indicate whether they have no problems,
slight problems, moderate problems, severe problems or extreme
problems in each dimension.76 Each of these levels is assigned a
weight previously elicited by the visual analogue scale or the time
trade-off method. The exact combination of answers provided by the
respondents determines the QALY-weight of the health condition.
The Health Utilities Index Mark 3 (HUI3)77 uses eight dimensions to
classify health states: vision, hearing, speech, ambulation, dexterity,
emotion, cognition and pain. Each dimension has five or six different
levels to indicate the impact of the condition. There are some other
generic measures besides the EQ-5D and the HUI3, but these two are
regarded as the better measures to elicit QALY-weights.78
The different methods may lead to different results, among others
because of the type of questions that is being asked. Also the type of
respondent may affect the result: does the research target the general
public, or people who actually experience the health condition under
consideration, or health specialists? And if one targets the people who
experience the health condition, then it is important to know when the
research was done, because the respondents may have adapted to the
health condition in the meantime. Adaptation may therefore result in
76 Rabin, Oemar and Oppe 2011.
77 Horsman et al. 2003.
78 Brazier et al. 1999, p. 76.
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lower QALY-losses because people learn to live with their condition.79
This all implies that applying QALYs to assess pain and suffering
damages in the way I will propose below, does not necessarily result
in one unique, ‘correct’ amount. The research does, however, provide
an upper and lower boundary for the QALY-weight of the health
condition, between which the QALY-weight of the health condition
may vary. This allows a judge who may want to apply the QALY-
approach to fine-tune the exact amount of pain and suffering
damages on the basis of the concrete circumstances of the case, but
still to base the damages on health economics insights regarding the
impact of the health condition on the quality of life.
For example, assume that there are three high quality health
economics researches regarding the difference in QALY-weight
between people who have vision in one eye and people who have
vision in two eyes. The first paper assesses this difference at 0.1, the
second at 0.07 and the third at 0.12. We could the use this informa-
tion to assess the immaterial loss someone would suffer when losing
(sight in) one eye at 0.07-0.12 QALY per year. As explained above,
given that we are looking for an objective expression of the average
loss, it would make sense to assess the loss at 0.095 QALY (the
average of the three values found in the literature), but to allow the
court some discretion within the given boundaries to incorporate
characteristics of the case.
Summarizing, QALYs express the reduction in quality of life of the
victim, caused by an injury or illness, in which the nature, severity
and duration of the health condition play an essential role. This is, in
my opinion, exactly what pain and suffering damages seek to reflect.
Before one can use QALYs to assess pain and suffering damages,
they need to be expressed in monetary terms. This is not an easy task.
Various methods exist, which may yield different outcomes.80 Many
factors are relevant in assessing the monetary value of a QALY, and
because these factors may differ per country, the resulting amounts
may also differ per country. Therefore, in order to apply the QALY-
method in the Netherlands we should focus on a Dutch amount. In
the Dutch literature an amount of e80,000 is often mentioned as an
79 Dolan 2000, p. 1738ff; Bagenstos and Schlanger 2007, p. 763ff.
80 It lies beyond the scope of this inaugural lecture to discuss the relevant aspects of
monetization of QALYs in detail. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see e.g.
Karapanou and Visscher 2010, p. 63 and Karapanou 2014, p. 122ff and the literature
mentioned there.
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upper limit, while the lower limit is often set at e20,000 per QALY.81
So, there is no single ‘correct amount’, but it makes sense to apply an
amount which lies between these two limits. European research from
2010 suggested a value for the Netherlands of about e34.000-
e43.000 per QALY.82 In a recent publication it is stated that the
Dutch are, on average, willing to pay e52,200 for a QALY of someone
else.83 In 2010, Dutch health economist Pomp assessed a QALY at
e50,000.84
As said, there is no unique correct amount of a QALY. In order to
use QALYs for the assessment of pain and suffering damages for
personal injuries, one has to choose an amount. In my view, given the
upper and lower limit of e80,000 and e20,000 respectively and
given the recent Dutch publications which assess a QALY at (about)
e50,000, this amount provides a good benchmark. In any case it
does not seem to make sense to apply an amount lower than
e20,000 per QALY or higher than e80,000 per QALY. For the
examples in Section 3.4 below, I will apply an amount of e50,000
per QALY.
3.4 Examples of QALY-based pain and suffering damages
In this section I will provide a few examples of how QALYs could be
used to assess pain and suffering damages. As said, for the calcula-
tions I will use a value of e50.000 per QALY. I will compare the
resulting amounts with the damages as they are actually awarded in
Dutch cases. This exercise will show indeed that current pain and
suffering damages in the Netherlands are too low, and that the
‘relative ranking’ of injuries on the basis of QALYs is different from
the ordering that results in case law.
3.4.1 Non-complicated fractures
A non-complicated leg fracture results in about e1,500-e1,650 in
pain and suffering damages in the Netherlands, while in more com-
plicated fractures amounts of about e2,300 have been awarded.85
Health economics research has investigated whether in cases of a
81 See e.g. Raad voor de Volksgezondheid en Zorg 2006, p. 33, 43, 91ff; Helsloot, Pieterman
and Hanekamp 2010, p. 135ff; Hamberg-van Reenen and Meijer 2011.
82 European Value of a Quality Adjusted Life Year (EuroVaQ) 2010.
83 Van Gils, Schoemaker and Polder 2013, p. 3. They refer to Bobinac et al. 2013.
84 Pomp 2010.
85 ANWB 2015, p. 17ff.
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broken leg (more specifically, a closed tibial shaft fracture) it is
worthwhile to perform surgery very quickly, within twelve hours.86
When analyzing the successive stages of the healing process and the
corresponding QALY-weights during those stages, it turns out that,
depending on how quickly surgery was performed, the total QALY
loss during the healing process can be assessed at about 0.087-0.13
QALYs if there are no remaining side effects of the fracture.87
Expressed in money, applying a value of e50,000 per QALY, this
would amount to e4,350-e6,500, so three to four times as high as
the amounts which are actually awarded in the Netherlands.
A broken collarbone results in about e1,100 in pain and suffering
damages in the Netherlands, although in several cases damages are
higher due to accompanying injuries, such as bruises or a broken
nose.88 Recent health economics research compares the traditional
treatment (a mitella or sling) with surgery.89 In this research, the
average QALY-weight of living with a healing fracture during the heal-
ing process, is assessed at 0.706 and the average duration of the healing
process at about 28 weeks. The average QALY-weight after complete
healing was 0.842. The QALY-loss due to the fracture in my view can
then be assessed at 0.0748 QALY: the decrease from 0.0842 to 0.706
(so, 0.136) lasts for about 28 weeks, so 0.55 year, and
0.136*0.55=0.0748. Applying e50,000 per QALY this would result in
damages of e3,740, so about three times as high as actually awarded.
3.4.2 Loss of an eye
Loss of an eye often results in about e22,000-e30,000 in pain and
suffering damages in the Netherlands.90 Health economics research
has investigated whether cataract surgery to the second eye, after
successful surgery to the first eye, is worthwhile. According to this
research, the difference in QALY-weight between sight in one eye and
sight in two eyes, is 0.109.91 A study regarding diabetes related com-
plications suggests a QALY-loss of about 0.074 due to loss of an eye.92
This decrease in QALY-weight reflects the decrease in quality of
life during one year. Given that loss of an eye is a permanent injury,
86 Sprague and Bhandari 2002.
87 Idem, p. 321.
88 ANWB 2015, p. 75.
89 Pearson et al. 2010, p. 426.
90 ANWB 2015, p. 64ff.
91 Brown et al. 2001, p. 644; Busbee et al. 2003, p. 2312.
92 Clarke, Gray and Holman 2002, p. 344.
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in principle the victim should annually receive e3,700-e5,450 for the
rest of his life (0.074 resp. 0.109 multiplied by e50,000). However,
it is standard practice in the Netherlands to award damages in a lump
sum. Therefore, this stream of periodic payments has to be converted
into an amount at once. For simplicity’s sake I calculate the net
present value of this stream of future payments, but I realize that in
practice more complicated methods are used.93 The QALY-method
would result in pain and suffering damages of e79,000-e117,000 for
a 44-year old man (who received e25,418 in reality)94 and e107,000-
e158,000 for an 18-year old female (who received e30,429).95
Hence, QALY-damages for loss of an eye based on e50,000 per
QALY are about three to five times as high as the actually awarded
amounts.
3.4.3 Deafness of young children
In two Dutch cases on medical malpractice where a five year old child
and an unborn child became deaf in both ears, pain and suffering
damages of e49,617 and e72,780 have been awarded.96 There exists
extensive health economics research regarding cochlear implants
(which directly electronically stimulate the auditory nerve system).
This research suggests that deafness in both ears results in a QALY-
loss of 0.145-0.281, depending on the effect of traditional, acoustic
hearing devices.97 Research which focused specifically on deaf
93 I take the life expectancy as published by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (see http://
statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/selection/?DM=SLNL&PA=37360NED&VW=T) and apply a dis-
count rate of 3%, because this is the rate that is often applied in the Netherlands. It is
based on an estimated 6% return on capital and an inflation rate of 3%. The Court of
Appeal’s Hertogenbosch ruled that due to the recent low interest rate and the expectations
for the future, a lower discount rate of 2.2% (4.2% return on capital and 2% inflation)
should be applied for the first twenty years (Court of Appeal’s Hertogenbosch, November
5, 2013, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2013:5188). However, because the cases I discuss are older cases,
I do not apply this correction. I realize that in practice more complicated models are used
to calculate the lump sum, in which also taxes are included. In principle, the annual
amounts as determined by the QALY-loss can be plugged into those models, so that
QALY-based pain and suffering damages can be determined in the usual way.
94 The accident in this case happened in 1992 and a 44-year old male then had a remaining
life expectancy of 33 years. The net present value of 33 payments of e3,700-e5,450 with a
discount rate of 3% is e79,138-e116,569.
95 The accident in this case happened in 1996 and an 18-year old female then had a remaining
life expectancy of 63 years. The net present value of 63 payments of e3,700-e5,450 with a
discount rate of 3% is e107,301-e158,052.
96 ANWB 2015, p. 135.
97 Summerfield et al. 2002, p. 1259.
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children found a difference of 0.237 QALY between no implant and a
unilateral implant (so in one ear), and a difference of 0.076 QALY
between unilateral and bilateral implants. The total difference
between deafness and bilateral implants hence is 0.313 QALY.98 An
older publication asked parents of deaf children to assess the quality
of life before and (well) after the implant. Depending on the exact
research method, this difference was assessed at 0.22-0.39 QALY.99
The value of 0.39 was found by using extensive questionnaires which
also asked about the impact of the deafness on speech, cognition and
emotion. In Section 3.3 above it already became clear that such
methods are being regarded as the qualitatively better methods.
The QALY-loss due to deafness hence can be assessed at 0.22-0.39
per year, depending also on the age of the person involved. When
focusing on young children and when also incorporating the influence
of deafness at a young age on speech, cognition and emotion (as is
explicitly done by the court in the Dutch case concerning the child that
went deaf before birth), an assessment of the QALY-loss of 0.313-0.39
seems better, so e15,650-e19,500 per year. This would result in pain
and suffering damages of about e470,000-e585,000 for the five year
old,100 and about e7,500-e9,500 higher for the baby.101 This implies
damages six to eleven times as high as currently awarded.
3.4.4 Other examples
Without going into the details of the underlying cases and the health
economics research used for the QALY-weights,102 it also turns out in
other types of injuries that pain and suffering damages based on
QALYs, where a monetary value of e50,000 per QALY is applied,
significantly exceed the amounts that are actually awarded. For ampu-
tation of a forearm, QALY-based damages would be about nine times
as high, for amputation of a lower leg about seven times as high and
98 Summerfield et al. 2010, p. 620. Given that bilateral implants do not yield a quality of
hearing which is equivalent to natural hearing, this 0.313 might still be an underestimation
of the impact of deafness on the quality of life.
99 Cheng et al. 2000, p. 853.
100 The accident in this case happened in 1991 and a 5-year old male then had a remaining life
expectancy of 70 years. The net present value of 70 payments of e15,650-e19,500 with a
discount rate of 3% is e469,455-e584,944.
101 The accident in this case happened in 1991 and the life expectancy of a male baby then was
74 years. As compared to the previous case, the net present value of these four additional
future payments is e7,567-e9,429.
102 For this information, see Visscher 2013 and Visscher 2015. Note that in these publications a
higher discount rate of 4% was applied.
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for paralysis about five times as high. A noticeable exception is
HIV-infection, which according to QALY-research would result in
about the same amount of damages as actually awarded. The likely
explanation is that due to improved medication, the quality of life and
the remaining life expectancy of HIV-infected persons nowadays is
much better than in the 1990s when the actual cases were being
tried.103
3.5 Conclusion
This overview of cases suggests that pain and suffering damages in
the Netherlands are substantially too low from an economic
perspective. I therefore share the first critique of Dutch legal scholars
that pain and suffering damages are systematically too low. This
frustrates the preventive goal of tort law, and obviously also result
in incomplete compensation.
The QALY-method provides a different ‘relative ranking’ of injuries
than the Smartengeldboek. When applying the QALY-method, pain and
suffering damages for some types of injuries would increase more than
for other types of injuries. However, one cannot say that damages for
more serious injuries systematically fall even shorter than those for
minor injuries, so I do not share the second critique of Dutch legal
scholars. It is noteworthy that actually the case for which the highest pain
and suffering damages are awarded in the Netherlands (HIV-infection)
results in the lowest increase when applying the QALY-method.
Given the too low level of damages across the board, I fully
support the plea to increase pain and suffering damages for personal
injuries. Based on QALYs I advocate an even larger increase than
many lawyers would propose. Wouldn’t this make activities which
may cause injuries too expensive so that socially desirable activities
might be stopped? In my view: no. After all, whether an activity is
socially desirable does not only depend on its benefits, but also on its
costs. If an activity can only be undertaken profitably if it does not
bear all the costs it causes, in economic terms it is not a desirable
activity and the externality is not fully internalized. The victims whose
losses are not fully compensated then in a sense ‘subsidize’ this
activity and that cannot be a good situation.104
103 See Nakagawa et al. 2012.
104 This echoes Lloyd George’s alleged saying in the field of workers’ compensation that ‘the
cost of the product should bear the blood of the working man’.
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4 Affection damages
4.1 Introduction
The second form of debated damages I want to discuss, is ‘affection
damages’. This regards non-pecuniary losses suffered by a well-
defined group of people who stand in a close (emotional and affec-
tive) relationship with a victim of e.g. a tort or crime who suffered
grave and permanent injuries or who was killed.105 The Dutch term
for these losses is affectieschade, which I translate as affection losses.
The term ‘bereavement damages’ in my view is too narrow, because it
only encompasses fatalities, while affection damages can also be
awarded in cases of non-fatal accidents. As shorthand notation I will
refer to the group of people who can claim affection damages as
‘relatives’, even though this term is not fully accurate.106
In March 2005, the Second Chamber of the Dutch parliament
accepted a draft bill which concerned affection damages. In order to
avoid long and possibly unsavory procedures, the draft suggested a
fixed amount of e10,000. In 2010 the Senate rejected the draft bill,
among others because there was doubt whether the goal of recogni-
tion of the loss of the relatives could be reached by a ‘translation’ into
a monetary award (which often will be paid by an insurance company)
and because of the fear of a claim culture.
In May 2014 a new draft bill regarding, among others, affection
damages was proposed for public consultation. In Section 4.2 I will
briefly describe the proposal, in so far as it concerns affection
damages, in more detail and in Section 4.3 I will provide a Law and
Economics view on the topic of affection damages, evaluating the
draft bill from that perspective.
4.2 The draft bill from May 2014
In this section I will briefly describe the draft bill and the literature in
which the draft bill has been discussed, in so far as it concerns the
topic of affection damages. Other aspects of the draft bill, such as
compensation of reasonable costs of nursing and domestic help, lie
outside the scope of the analysis.
105 See e.g. Hebly, Van der Zalm and Engelhard 2015, p. 98.
106 Not all eligible people are relatives, and not all relatives are eligible, see Section 4.2.
The draft bill introduces affection damages in the case of fatal-
ities (Article 6:108 section 3 of the Dutch Civil Code) and of grave
and permanent injuries (Article 6:107 section 1 sub b). Eligible for
these damages are (a) the spouse or registered partner of the victim,
(b) the life companion who has or had an enduring common
household with the victim, (c) parents and (d) children of the victim,
(e) persons who have in an enduring way taken care of the victim in
a family setting or (f) vice versa and (g) other persons who, at the
time of the event which injured or killed the victim, had such a
close connection with the victim that reasonably they should be
regarded as relative.
Lindenbergh argues that the draft bill primarily wants to acknowl-
edge the immaterial loss of the relatives, something which almost all
European countries already do.107 Hartlief writes that the draft bill
rightfully expands damages for so-called ‘secondary victims’.108 Ver-
heij explains that the modest magnitude of the amounts is related to
the two functions these damages serve: recognition of the suffering of
the relatives and appeasement of their shocked feelings,109 although
he also argues that for the latter function, fixed modest amounts are
problematic.110 This function requires that the party who caused the
losses must make a certain sacrifice, which might not be the case
with fixed modest amounts. Verheij mentions that to avoid unsavory
discussions and to limit the system costs, the proposal uses fixed
modest amounts and he explicitly argues that affection damages are
symbolical and that they do not aim at compensation.111 The proposed
amounts vary from e12,500 to e20,000, depending on the type of
relative, the type of wrongdoing (e.g. accidents or crimes) and the type
of injury (fatal or non-fatal). The below table shows the current
proposal.112
107 Lindenbergh 2014, p. 856. The Explanatory Memorandum to the draft bill states on p. 5 that
besides the Netherlands, Germany is the only European country without a form of affection
damages.
108 Hartlief 2014a, p. 1727.
109 Verheij 2014, p. 222ff.
110 Verheij 2014, p. 224. Also see Hebly, Van der Zalm and Engelhard 2015, p. 102.
111 Idem. Also see Lindenbergh 2014, p. 856.
112 Also see e.g. Verheij 2014, p. 222, Rijnhout 2014, p. 125 and Hebly, Van der Zalm and
Engelhard 2015, p. 102. The letters within parentheses in the first column refer to the
groups of entitled relatives which are mentioned in the text above.
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Grave and
permanent
injuries Death
In case of violent crime
Grave and
permanent
injuries Death
Spouse, registered partner, life
companion (a, b)
e15,000 e17,500 e17,500 e20,000
Minor children or adult children
living at home and parents (c, d)
e15,000 e17,500 e17,500 e20,000
Foster parents and foster
children (e, f)
e15,000 e17,500 e17,500 e20,000
Adult children not living at
home and parents (c, d)
e12,500 e15,000 e15,000 e17,500
Care in family situation (e and f) e12,500 e15,000 e15,000 e17,500
Other close connection (g) e12,500 e15,000 e15,000 e17,500
4.3 An economic perspective on affection damages
Various legal authors have stressed that the proposed amounts of
e12,500-e20,000 are symbolical. In practice, symbolical amounts
tend to be modest, and that is also the case in the draft bill. Recently,
legal sociologist Schwitters made a plea for the symbolical function of
pain and suffering damages in general.113 For that function, the link
between damages and the norm violation is important, and the
damages do not necessarily equal the loss so that pain and suffering
damages could actually decrease. The symbolical function is espe-
cially important for the functions of enforcement and appeasement
and liability mostly serves the goal of underlining the importance of
the behavioral norm. Schwitters contrasts these functions with those
of compensation and prevention.
From an economic perspective, not much can be said about the
symbolical function of damages. If indeed the goal is to signal, ex
post, that the tortfeasor did not act according to the norm and is
responsible for the immaterial losses of the victims, or to give a signal
to the victim that he is not to blame, one could indeed use a symbo-
lical amount.114 This amount should then be based on the reprehen-
sibility of the behavior.115 However, it is not clear to me why such
symbolical amounts should necessarily be modest.
113 Schwitters 2014.
114 Suurmond and Van Velthoven 2005, p. 1934.
115 Compare Polinsky and Shavell 1998, p. 948ff.
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From the perspective of prevention and compensation, some
additional observations can be made. First, just as with other forms
of non-pecuniary losses, given that affection losses lower the utility of
the people involved, they do constitute real losses and therefore, in
principle, should be included in tort damages.
Second, because these losses cannot be measured exactly, we need
an abstract method of assessing them. By using standardized
amounts which express the loss in general terms, the costs of the
legal system can be reduced, which is positive.116 The legal desire to
avoid unsavory procedures is thus perfectly aligned with the eco-
nomic desire to limit the system costs.
Third, from a prevention and compensation perspective, the
proposed amounts of e12,500-e20,000 seem too low. Suurmond
and Van Velthoven have argued that affection damages could be
based on the so-called Value of a Statistical Life, in short VSL.117 This
VSL is derived from all kinds of decisions individuals take which
affect health and safety. Examples are installing an airbag in a car,
using seatbelts, installing a smoke detector and buying safer, more
expensive products. Such market choices contain an implicit trade-
off between money and risks, and these tradeoffs are used to esti-
mate the VSL. If, for example, a thousand people are willing to
spend up to e2,000 each on a safety measure which reduces the
probability of a fatal accident by one permille, in total e2 million is
spent and one live is saved. The VSL in this example would then be
e2 million.
The VSL should not be regarded as the ‘true value of a human
life’, but rather as the tradeoff that results from given research.
According to Sunstein, the VSL is currently set at about 9 million
dollars.118 This American VSL is comparable to the VSL found in
other developed countries.119 Suurmond and Van Velthoven state that
the VSL consists of two components: (1) the money the deceased
himself would otherwise have spent on consumption during his life,
and (2) the non-pecuniary loss of the relatives. The authors apply a
low estimation of the VSL of e2 million120 and assume that the
116 Suurmond and Van Velthoven 2005, p. 1936 also see this as a positive point in the first
draft bill regarding affection damages.
117 See e.g. Viscusi and Aldy 2003; Sunstein 2004; Sunstein and Posner 2005; Ashenfelter
2006.
118 Sunstein 2014, p. 7. For older research, see Sunstein 2004, p. 205; Sunstein and Posner
2005, p. 563.
119 Viscusi and Aldy 2003, p. 24, 35 and 63.
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consumption component will not exceed e1 million. This would
imply that the immaterial loss of the relatives would then be at least
e1 million.121 A recent Dutch report on traffic safety also states that
the VSL consists of lost consumption and immaterial loss. The VSL
in this report is assessed at e2.5 million and the immaterial loss-
component at e2 million.122 These amounts originate from 2011.
Corrected for inflation, they would amount to about e3.2 million
resp. e2.5 million.123
Sunstein and Posner however argue that the VSL most likely does
not include the loss to survivors, because it is doubtful whether
people’s willingness to pay to reduce accident risks includes the grief
of their dependents. A different way of assessing these losses is
therefore needed.124 They acknowledge that it is very difficult to
express grief in monetary terms, but based on research which com-
pares the self-reported happiness of married people with that of
widowed persons, assuming an average of five years before remar-
riage, they state that an amount of about e625,000 would ‘not be the
worst place to start’.125 Obviously, if there are more dependents, for
example children, the amount should be higher, sometimes much
higher.126
A more recent paper studies mental distress caused by bereave-
ment and investigates how happiness regression equations might be
used to assess damages for emotional harm and pain and suffering.
As the authors of this paper themselves write: ‘We use regression
equations in which a measure of subjective well-being is the depen-
dent variable. Intuitively, our method can trace out a form of indif-
ference curve between income and any kind of life event (such as
bereavement). This is achieved, put loosely, by measuring how many
happiness points are gained on average by a higher income of X
120 This e2 million (in Euros from 1997) is mentioned as a ‘safe lower boundary’ for the VSL in
the Netherlands in the Dutch PhD dissertation of A.T. de Blaeij (The value of a statistical life
in road safety; Stated preference methodologies and empirical estimates for the Netherlands,
Amsterdam (VU) 2003) to which the authors refer.
121 This e1 million again is a - very safe - lower boundary, according to the authors.
122 Wijnen 2014, p. 13ff.
123 Inflation calculated on the basis of data of the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics: www.cbs.
nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/prijzen/cijfers/extra/prijzen-toen-nu.htm.
124 Sunstein and Posner 2005, p. 568ff, 595.
125 Sunstein and Posner 2005, p. 571ff. The original amount mentioned by the authors is
$400,000 (in 1990 dollars). American inflation is calculated on http://fxtop.com/en/infla-
tion-calculator.php. Conversion into ‘Dutch Euros’ is done via http://stats.oecd.org/Index.
aspx?DataSetCode=PPPGDP.
126 Sunstein and Posner 2005, p. 586.
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thousand dollars and how many happiness points are lost by the
death of a loved one and then calculating the ratio of the two.’127
They use data from the British Household Panel Survey, which
contains responses from over 10,000 adult individuals from 1992-
2005 on questions regarding various issues, among which is the
impact of bereavement.128 Bereavement increases psychological dis-
tress as expressed with the help of the ‘12-item general Health Ques-
tionnaire’ (GHQ-12). The authors then study which increase in
income would, on a statistical level, offset the distress from bereave-
ment.129 Various econometric specifications yield different results.
The authors warn that their paper’s contribution is methodological
and they do not ‘attempt to adjudicate between the compensation
amounts calculated under different econometric specifications’.130
They do provide an overview with ‘illustrative valuations of compen-
satory damages in the first year’, which would amount to about
£114,000-£202,000 for a partner and £89,000-£140,000 for a
child.131 Expressed in current Euros and accounting for the difference
in the standard of living between the UK and the Netherlands, the
amounts would be about e163,000-e288,000 resp. e127,000-
e200,000.132 Note (again) that this only relates to the first year after
death of the partner or child.
An older Swiss publication which asked respondents to consider
themselves either as potential victims of a road accident or as relatives
of potential victims and to state their willingness to pay to reduce the
likelihood of such an accident occurring, suggests that the immaterial
losses to relatives of victims of traffic accidents are about 25% higher
than the immaterial losses to victims themselves.133 The immaterial
loss to relatives was assessed at about Sfr 2 million for fatal accidents
and a bit higher for injuries resulting in severe and permanent
disabilities. Expressed in current Euros and accounting for the
difference in the standard of living between Switzerland and the
Netherlands, this would amount to about e1.2 million.134
127 Oswald and Powdthavee 2008, p. S220.
128 Idem, p. S224ff.
129 Idem, p. S231ff.
130 Idem, p. S240.
131 Idem.
132 British inflation is calculated on http://fxtop.com/en/inflation-calculator.php. Conversion
into ‘Dutch Euros’ is done via http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PPPGDP.
133 Schwab, Christe and Soguel 1996, p. 285ff.
134 Swiss inflation is calculated on http://fxtop.com/en/inflation-calculator.php. Conversion
into ‘Dutch Euros’ is done via http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PPPGDP.
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It would be interesting to analyze whether the QALY-framework
could also provide insights regarding the ‘proper’ magnitude of
bereavement damages. A full discussion goes beyond the scope of
this inaugural lecture, but the basic idea can be explained as follows.
In the generic methods to illicit QALY-weights, such as the Health
Utilities Index Mark 3 (HUI3),135 emotions form a separate category.
For example, the HUI3 distinguishes between various physical fac-
tors (such as vision, hearing, speech, ambulation, and pain) and also
includes ‘emotion’ as a separate category. The possible levels of
emotion in the HUI3 are ‘happy and interested in life’, ‘somewhat
happy’, ‘somewhat unhappy’, ‘very unhappy’ and ‘so unhappy that life
is not worthwhile’. The total QALY-level of a person is determined by
his levels on all health factors.136
If we assume that the death or injury of a loved-one only affects
the factor emotion of the secondary victim while leaving the other
factors unchanged and if we furthermore assume that this secondary
victim was otherwise healthy and happy, we can assess the QALY-loss
due to the affection losses. We then need to know by how much the
happiness level decreases and how long this lasts. Obviously this
would require more research, but by way of example, assume that
after the death of a partner the secondary victim drops to the level
‘very unhappy’ for two years, ‘somewhat unhappy’ for the subsequent
two years, ‘somewhat happy’ for the next two years and then has
returned to the original level of ‘happy and interested in life’. The
total loss, based on the underlying formula of the HUI3, would then
be about 1.46 QALYs.137 Again assuming a value of e50,000 per
QALY, this would be about e73,000 in affection damages.
The above economic research regarding bereavement does not
yield identical results, which was not to be expected given that the
research originates from different countries and applies different
methods which are not all equally developed yet. But the overview
does suggest that the amounts for affection damages currently pro-
posed in the draft bill are (much) too low. However, as Sunstein and
Posner also state, even though any particular amount is, to some
degree, arbitrary, it is certainly preferable to zero138 and that of course
135 See footnote 77.
136 See www.healthutilities.com/hui3.htm for the exact formula.
137 The loss in the first and second year is 0.49356, in the third and fourth year 0.20565 and in
the fifth and sixth year 0.06855 (see www.healthutilities.com/hui3.htm). The net present
value of these QALY-losses yields a total QALY loss of 1.456034.
138 Sunstein and Posner 2005, p. 571ff.
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also holds for the proposed modest amounts in the draft bill. In a
sense this relates to the statements of Verheij and Lindenbergh who
write that even though it is possible to have a discussion about the
details of the draft bill, there is a danger that ‘the best is sometimes
the enemy of the good’.139 In so far as the amounts currently pro-
posed in the draft bill are the most that is feasible at this moment, a
Law and Economics plea for (substantially) higher amounts should
not result in rejection of the draft. After all, modest amounts in the
range of e12,500-e20,000 are better than no amount at all, irrespec-
tive of whether one aims for prevention, compensation, recognition
or appeasement.
139 Lindenbergh 2014, p. 857; Verheij 2014, p. 226.
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5 Mass damages
5.1 Introduction
The last topic I want to discuss today is mass damages. Currently, in
the Netherlands, article 3:305a CC allows certain organizations to
institute an action, intended to protect similar interests of other
persons. Let’s call this ‘mass litigation’. Section 3 of Article 3:305a
CC forbids such mass litigation to have the object of seeking mone-
tary compensation. Let’s call this ‘mass damages litigation’. It is
therefore important not to confuse ‘mass litigation’ (which is allowed)
and ‘mass damages litigation’ (which is not allowed).
On July 7, 2014, a draft of a proposal for a bill was published
which enables mass damages litigation. The public consultation
closed on October 1, 2014, so this is a very recent example of debated
damages. I will first briefly sketch the economic advantages and
challenges of mass litigation140 and will subsequently assess the
Dutch situation from that viewpoint.
5.2 Mass litigation from an economic perspective
5.2.1 Benefits of mass litigation
A potential tortfeasor only receives behavioral incentives from tort law
if he is confronted with the losses he has caused. However, if the
expected benefits of a lawsuit for the victim (which may consist of
damages, but also of non-pecuniary benefits such as seeing the
wrongdoer being sanctioned) do not outweigh the costs of litigation
(money, time, efforts et cetera), a victim might stay rationally apathetic
so that he might not start a case in the first place.141 Especially in
situations of scattered losses, where many victims each suffer only a
small loss, this is a realistic danger. Free-riding might exacerbate this
problem: some victims might wait to see if someone else starts a suit
from which they benefit, for example from an injunction but also
from the fact that certain questions regarding negligence, causation
et cetera have already been answered, without bearing the costs.
140 In this sketch I do not incorporate the debate regarding the impact of lawyers’ remunera-
tion (hourly fee versus contingency fee) on the principal-agent problems, because that lies
beyond the scope of this lecture. The debate is not about allowing contingency fees but
about allowing mass damages litigation in the Netherlands.
141 See e.g. Kalven and Rosenfield 1941, p. 685; Landes and Posner 1975, p. 33ff; Schäfer 2000,
p. 184ff; Micklitz and Stadler 2006, p. 1476; Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh 2010, p. 59ff;
Cassone and Ramello 2011, p. 208ff; Biard 2014, p. 13ff.
Mass litigation could ameliorate the rational apathy problem,
because the costs of litigation (e.g. lawyers’ fees, costs of experts,
court fees) are spread over more persons, which reduces the costs per
plaintiff. Similarly, the costs when losing the case are spread over
more people, which in essence is a form of risk spreading. The extent
to which rational apathy may be overcome is influenced by the type of
mass litigation procedure. With an opt-in procedure, individual vic-
tims might still find the costs of joining the procedure too high,
especially if at that stage it is not clear how many others will join.142
Opt-out procedures score better in this respect because, exactly due to
rational apathy for example, opt-out rates can be expected to be low.143
The group under an opt-out procedure will hence be larger than
under an opt-in procedure, which also affects the costs per individual.
Free-riding will also occur less under an opt-out procedure, because a
potential free-rider would have to actively leave the group, which
might not be attractive in case of relatively low individual losses.144
An additional advantage of mass litigation is that, if more victims
are willing to bring their claim, the full extent of the losses becomes
clearer, which is relevant in determining whether or not the injurer
was negligent.
Furthermore mass litigation may reduce the total system costs
because some questions regarding unlawfulness, causation or loss do
not have to be discussed over and over again in the separate
individual claims.145 Whether or not total costs indeed decrease is
not certain, because in the absence of mass litigation, few or no
individual claims might have been brought due to rational apathy.146
Also, mass claims are more complicated, so that the procedure is
more expensive than in an individual case. The cost reduction due to
economies of scale of having one rather than many procedures has
therefore to be compared to the increase in cost due to the increased
complexity of the case. An additional relevant point regarding the
total system costs is that mass actions often result in settlement,
which is less costly than litigation.147
142 Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh 2010, p. 60.
143 See e.g. Eisenberg and Miller 2004, p. 1532 for an empirical analysis of this issue.
144 Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh 2010, p. 61.
145 Also see Dam 1975, p. 49; Cassone and Ramello 2011, p. 2010.
146 That would of course have resulted in problems such as under-compensation, inadequate
deterrent incentives et cetera.
147 Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh 2010, p. 63. Note that the cost-decreasing aspect of mass
litigation is also regarded as a benefit to the defendants, see Biard 2014, p. 17ff.
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Also information asymmetry might call for mass litigation. In
situations such as violations of consumer law, individual victims
might not even know that a tort has been committed, or they might
not have enough information to establish negligence, causation et
cetera.148 Article 3:305a CC enables a representative organization to
litigate to protect the interests of the victims. If this organization has
better information than the individual victims, for example because it
is a repeat player that has gained expertise or because it has more
assets to hire experts or specialized lawyers, the threat of liability
becomes more realistic.
5.2.2 Challenges of mass litigation
Besides these advantages, mass litigation also entails several chal-
lenges. The free-riding problem might not be fully solved, as long as
individuals can first wait for the result of the mass litigation before
they decide whether they want to be bound by it. Victims with
relatively large losses might not opt in (under an opt-in procedure)
or might opt out (under an opt-out procedure) because they expect a
better outcome in an individual case, where they may use the out-
come of the collective claim to their benefit. Especially if victims with
relatively large losses act as free-rider, the collective claim loses much
of its potential. A mandatory collective action could overcome this
problem, but is often regarded as contrary to due process.149
In addition, the principal-agent problem which already exists
between client and attorney in individual litigation might be exacer-
bated because in mass litigation the individual victims might even
have fewer incentives for adequate monitoring.150 The issue which
lies at the heart of the principal-agent problem is the fact that the
interests of principal and agent are not always well-aligned. The
principal has only limited possibilities to monitor and control the
behavior of the agent, and such monitoring and control is costly. In
individual cases where the stakes of the principal are relatively high, it
might be worthwhile to spend resources on adequate monitoring and
control. In mass litigation, where the stakes of individual principals
are much lower and where the interests may also differ between
principals, this might not be the case. The agent, be it a lawyer or a
representative organization, therefore might pursue his own
148 See e.g. Rosenberg 2000, p. 395; Deffains and Langlais 2011, p. 242ff.
149 Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh 2010, p. 62.
150 See e.g. Tzankova and Kortmann 2010, p. 124 and the literature mentioned there.
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interests, sometimes at the expense of the interests of the principal(s).151
This may result for example in inadequate efforts of the agent and in
accepting a settlement offer which is not in the best interest of the
principal.
The literature suggests that this problem might be less severe
with representative organizations than with the American style class
action, but it is not likely that the problem will be fully solved.
Relevant issues in this respect are in how far the victims can
influence the representative organization, in how far the representa-
tive organization can control its lawyers, and the possible influence of
third parties.152 The organization might not (only) be motivated by the
interests of the victims, but (also) by attracting media attention and by
pursuing political and/or ideological goals. It is therefore desirable
that requirements are posed regarding the representativeness and the
commitment of the organization, so that the scope for agency pro-
blems is reduced. However, in order to enable the victims to
influence the representative organization, they should have the
opportunity to opt out of a lawsuit and to join a competing
organization if they think this latter organization represents their
interests better. This implies that competition between organizations
should be possible and that the requirements posed to such organiza-
tions should not result in a (near) monopoly of one of them.153
A next challenge of mass litigation is the threat of frivolous suits,
which are intended to induce the defendant to settle, even if the case
has no merits (the so-called blackmail settlements).154 If the costs of
settling for the defendant are lower than the costs of going to court,
where the mere fact of being involved in a mass claim might cause
reputational losses, even a defendant with a strong case might prefer
to settle. The magnitude of this problem depends, among others, on
whether the loser has to pay the litigation costs of the winner. Also
the extent to which courts review the merits of the case may matter.
The magnitude of the problem furthermore depends on whether
defendants are more risk averse than plaintiffs, which would be
necessary for blackmail settlements to systematically occur. The
defendant allegedly would settle out of fear for high costs, but if
151 See e.g. Coffee 1995, p. 1347; Miller 1998, p. 259; Schäfer 2000, p. 197ff.
152 Schäfer 2000, p. 198; Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh 2010, p. 70ff; Keske 2010, p. 113 and
the literature mentioned there; Van den Bergh 2013, p. 29.
153 See Van den Bergh 2008, p. 294 and Van den Bergh 2013, p. 30.
154 Shavell and Rosenberg 1985; Schäfer 2000, p. 187ff.
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plaintiffs also fear such costs, especially when their claim is weak,
they might not have a credible threat of litigation to start with.155
Mass litigation has to be funded and this entails another
challenge.156 In the American style class action this funding is often
done via contingency fees. Because such fees are generally not
allowed in Europe, other forms of financing mass litigation are rele-
vant.157 Representative organizations may have an own budget, but
this might not be enough to cover the costs of a mass claim. If the
budget is financed out of membership fees, the important question is
whether members find mass litigation important enough to be will-
ing to pay for it via the higher fee. Especially if non-members also
benefit from the mass litigation and hence can act as free-riders, this
is doubtful. If the budget of the representative organization is not
large enough to cover the costs of mass litigation, other sources of
finance are needed. Besides private sponsors, the government could
fund such claims. Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh provide the
example of the German consumer associations which are almost
entirely financed by the government. The authors do not regard this
as a ‘miracle solution’ because government funding is also limited
and because it makes the association vulnerable to capture by politi-
cians, whose interests might depart from those of the represented
parties.158 Another possible way of financing mass litigation is allow-
ing the representative organization to receive a part of the damages
award, which resembles a system of contingency or conditional fees.
5.3 Evaluation of the current Dutch situation
Given the potential benefits of mass litigation which are described
above, in my view it is good that Dutch law (article 3:305a Civil Code)
allows mass litigation. It helps to overcome the rational apathy
problem and avoids having a (costly) series of individual lawsuits on
similar issues. Section 5 of this article contains an opt-out possibility,
155 Hay and Rosenberg 2000, p. 1402ff; Silver 2003, p. 1409ff; Campos 2012, p. 780ff.
156 See Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh 2010, p. 68ff.
157 As mentioned in footnote 140 above, it lies beyond the scope of this lecture to fully discuss
the advantages and disadvantages of contingency fees. For an overview of relevant litera-
ture, which also compares contingency fees with conditional fees, see e.g. Issacharoff and
Miller 2009, p. 197ff; Faure, Fernhout and Philipsen 2010; Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh
2010, p. 73ff; Van den Bergh 2013, p. 20ff.
158 Keske, Renda and Van den Bergh 2010, p. 69. Also see Issacharoff and Miller 2009,
p. 200ff and Van den Bergh 2013, p. 30ff.
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which in the Law and Economics literature is preferred over an opt-in
procedure. The possible principal-agent problems between the repre-
sented victims and representative organization are addressed by
requiring that the representative organization has to be a foundation
or association with full legal capacity that, according to its articles of
association, has the objective to protect specific interests. In addition,
such an organization is denied standing if the interests of the repre-
sented victims are insufficiently guaranteed by the claim. It might be
desirable to limit standing even further, for example only to organiza-
tions which have already proven to be truly representative for their
members. In cases of mass damage, many ad hoc organizations may
be formed which claim to represent the interests of victims but where
it is difficult or impossible for the victims to assess the quality of
these organizations.159 The requirements posed to representative
organizations, however, should not result in such high barriers to
entry that in fact a (near) monopoly of one representative
organization results.160
An interesting and attractive feature of the Dutch situation is that
the representative organization has no standing if it has not made a
sufficient attempt to achieve the object of the action through consul-
tations with the defendant. From an economic perspective, voluntary
transactions are generally preferred over involuntary transactions.
Parties themselves are assumed to know their own preferences best,
so that the price that is reached in a voluntary transaction is preferred
over the ‘forced price’ (i.e. damages) that a judge might set in a tort
case. After all, in a voluntary solution both objective and subjective
interests of the parties will be incorporated, because otherwise they
would not have reached an agreement. In a forced solution such as a
court decision, it is not certain that all interests are adequately
included, because courts are not able to perfectly assess subjective
elements.161 It is therefore better to try to solve a conflict via negotia-
tions than via litigation. However, high transaction costs might frus-
trate a voluntary transaction from being reached.162 Because
consultation with one representative organization entails lower
159 Also see Tzankova and Kortmann 2010, p. 119.
160 Van den Bergh 2008, p. 294 and Van den Bergh 2013, p. 30.
161 See e.g. Landes and Posner 1987, p. 31: ‘When the costs of voluntary market transactions
are low, the property approach is economically preferable to the liability approach because
the market is a more reliable register of values than the legal system.’
162 See among many others Calabresi and Melamed 1972; Coleman and Krauss 1995; Kaplow
and Shavell 1996b.
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transaction costs than consultation with many individual victims,
voluntary solutions become more feasible when representative
actions are allowed. Hence, in accordance with economic principles,
primacy lies with consultation.
This primacy of consultation is also desirable because it lowers the
danger of blackmail settlements. After all, an organization which does
not sufficiently attempt to achieve the object via consultation might be
denied standing. It is not likely that in the case of a meritless claim, the
organization can meet this criterion. The risk of frivolous suits is
furthermore reduced by the requirement that the action should suffi-
ciently guarantee the interests of the victims, as well as the fact that the
losing party has to pay the litigation costs of the winner.
However, if the consultations fail and the representative
organization and the defendant(s) do not reach a settlement, the
representative organization cannot claim monetary compensation in
collective litigation, due to the restriction of Section 3. Hence, there is
no action for damages possible, which could act as a ‘big stick’,
inducing unwilling defendants to settle. Even if a collective claim is
initiated and results in a declaration that the tortfeasor(s) acted
wrongfully, it will still take separate procedures to claim damages.
Due to possible rational apathy of the individual victims and the other
above-discussed problems, it is doubtful if such procedures would
actually be initiated.
Even though current Dutch legislation does not allow mass damages
litigation, it is certainly possible to deal with a case of mass losses
collectively. If the parties reach a settlement agreement, they can
jointly request this agreement to be declared binding for the entire
group of potential claimants via a Collective Settlement of Mass
Claims, in short the WCAM-procedure (‘Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling
Massaschade’).163 The representative organization and the defendant(s)
jointly petition the Amsterdam Court of Appeal for approval of their
settlement agreement. The court verifies that the organization is
sufficiently representative of the interest of the victims and the court
ensures notification of the settlement agreement to interested per-
sons. Unknown parties must be informed through advertisement in
the media. The court reviews the fairness of the proposed settlement
163 Article 7:907-910 Civil Code and Articles 1013-1018 Code of Civil Procedure.
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agreement, which is important because absent potential claimants
are also bound by the agreement, if declared generally binding. In
that case, interested parties must be notified that they can opt out
from the settlement.
The WCAM has a clear economic advantage: the system costs are
reduced because subsequent procedures are no longer required. The
fact that damages are not determined exactly in all cases individually
is no problem for the incentive function of tort law, as long as it is
correct on average.164 The opt-out option of the WCAM enables
potential plaintiffs whose losses substantially exceed the agreed
amount to start an individual claim after all, which avoids systematic
under-compensation. As explained above, the Law and Economics
literature generally holds that opt-out procedures are preferred over
opt-in procedures because they result in more victims being included
in the settlement. This feature of the WCAM hence can be evaluated
positively when compared to the opt-in alternative. However, if many
victims opt out, the cost-saving potential of mass actions could be
jeopardized. The free-riding problem might consequently still exist in
the WCAM, because victims can remain passive until it is fully clear
what the WCAM-settlement yields them, after which they could
decide to opt out. Given that empirical research suggest that opt-out
rates in general are low, the problem might not be so severe, but one
cannot rule out the possibility that especially victims with large losses
would opt out. It remains to be seen to what extent victims who do opt
out can use information from the collective settlement in their
subsequent individual claim.165 Furthermore, opting out is not
without risk, because if the victim does not reach a better result in
his individual claim, he cannot resort to the WCAM settlement.
A potential problem is that the WCAM-procedure requires a joint
request from the representative organization and defendant(s), and
unwilling defendants cannot be forced to do this. The Dutch situation
hence still lacks a ‘big stick’ to induce unwilling defendants to
164 Kaplow 1994; Kaplow and Shavell 1996a.
165 For example in the DSB-WCAM, in the settlement agreement it is explicitly stated that this
agreement is closed ‘sans prejudice and without acknowledging liability’ (p. 3 of the
‘Akkoord op hoofdlijnen’). Furthermore, in the WCAM petition itself in section 6.2 it is
stated that parties are not asking the court to give its opinion on the issues on which they
disagree, because they have chosen to end their dispute via a settlement. Section 6.4
explains that the fact that the parties have reached a settlement does not imply that they
agree on all the factual and legal issues at stake and section 6.5 states that the compen-
sation amounts in the settlement are reasonable when compared to the uncertainty that
litigation entails.
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cooperate. It is exactly this issue that forms one of the main reasons
for the proposed draft bill.
5.4 Evaluation of the proposed draft bill from July 2014
The proposed draft bill does not merely strike the prohibition on
collective damages litigation from article 3:305a. It introduces a pro-
cedure which is aiming at reaching a settlement, but it adds the
possibility for the court to establish a scheme for collective redress
of the mass damages claim based on damage-scheduling if no settle-
ment is reached. The consultation document explains that the lack of
a possibility of collective damages litigation was widely felt as a
problem in the Netherlands, but also that there was widespread
concern regarding the possible negative consequences of such a
mechanism. The proposed draft bill tries to avoid the negative con-
sequences (such as frivolous suits and blackmail settlements) and to
protect the justified interests of injured parties and of defendants.166
A full discussion of the draft bill lies beyond the scope of this
inaugural lecture. In this Section I will focus on the issue of allowing
mass damages litigation but I will not assess whether the proposed
procedure is optimal from an economic point of view.
As said, in the proposed draft bill, primacy still lies with jointly
settling the case. Several additional requirements as compared to the
current situation are introduced. The representative organization has
to show that it has adequate expertise in the area of the claim and that
it can be assumed to represent the interests in a careful way. The
group of persons represented has to be large enough to justify a
collective damages action and these persons must not have other
efficient and effective means to get compensation of their losses.
The representative organization must have tried to solve the conflict
via consultation with the defendant(s).
The court first has to assess whether all the requirements are met
for the representative organization to have standing. In the second
step, the court has to judge whether the defendant(s) is/are liable. If
the court indeed finds the defendant(s) liable, he orders the parties to
investigate whether a collective settlement can be reached. If this
fails, in the third step the court hears the parties and tries to help
them to reach a collective settlement. Legal issues can be discussed in
this phase and mediation can be tried. If still no collective settlement
166 Consultation document, p. 1 (www.internetconsultatie.nl/motiedijksma/document/1177).
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is reached, in the fourth step the court orders the parties, at the
request of (one of) them, to submit a proposal for a collective settle-
ment. In this phase, mediation can again be tried. If mediation is not
deemed useful or if a collective settlement still is not reached, in the
fifth step the court itself may establish a scheme for collective redress
of the claim. This scheme can be based on the proposals submitted by
the parties in step four.
This fifth step is the crucial new step, namely that the court
decides upon a collective resolution of the losses. This is the ‘big
stick’ that should solve the current problem that unwilling defendants
cannot be induced to settle and that mass damages litigation is not
possible. If a collective settlement is reached, a victim is only bound by
it (i) after accepting it (so opting in) or (ii) after the settlement is declared
generally binding in a WCAM-procedure and the victim did not opt
out. If a collective settlement is not reached and the court itself has to
establish a scheme for collective redress, the court may order victims
to opt in before the scheme indeed is established. If too few victims
opt in, the court may decide not to establish a scheme after all.
In my view the proposed draft bill is an improvement of the Dutch
situation. The problem of a lack of a credible threat of litigation, the
‘big stick’, is addressed because if no collective settlement is reached,
the court may establish a scheme for collective redress itself. Unwilling
defendants therefore can no longer avoid a collective resolution by not
settling.
The risk of blackmail settlements is limited, because the whole
procedure is aimed at reaching a collective settlement. In all phases,
if the party who requests the procedure to proceed to the next phase
did not try enough to reach a collective settlement, the request is
denied. I therefore do not share the fear of Van Duin and Lawant
that the proposed procedure would induce blackmail settlements to
avoid a long procedure.167 The representative organization cannot
threaten to force the procedure to proceed all the way to the
collective scheme because if it does not try enough to reach a
collective settlement, the procedure stops. Of course, it cannot be
ruled out that a defendant prefers a settlement over being involved
in a mass procedure after all, even if the claim is weak, but the fact
that representative organizations have to try to reach a collective
settlement limits this risk.
167 Van Duin and Lawant 2015, p. 10.
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Denying standing for organizations which are not representative,
do not have the necessary expertise, or which do not adequately serve
the interests of the victims, also combats frivolous suits.168 The fact
that these issues are dealt with before the court judges on liability in
my view is a good choice, because potential defendants do not have to
feel threatened by such organizations. The ‘loser pays’ principle may
also avoid frivolous litigation, although in the Netherlands this only
regards a part of the true costs.
Before establishing a scheme for collective redress, the court may
require parties to call upon victims to opt in. If the court decides not
to give a resolution in case too few victims opt in, the defendant still
might face no liability. Due to rational apathy, there is a non-negli-
gible possibility that indeed only few victims opt in and this could
result in a situation where the collective damages actions fails after
all. In my view this is a problematic aspect in the proposed procedure,
and uncooperative defendants could try to make use of this. Whether
in practice this indeed happens, crucially depends on how the court
applies this option. In any case, this potential problem of rational
apathy seems smaller than in the current situation where mass
damages litigation is not possible in the first place. After all, the costs
of starting an individual claim are likely to outweigh the costs of
opting-in to a proposed scheme for collective redress.
After a scheme for collective redress has been established, people
on whose behalf this is done, have to opt in to be bound by it. So this
is an opt-in after the result of the procedure is known. In the litera-
ture, the fear is expressed that this feature may frustrate reaching a
settlement, because victims might simply wait for the outcome of the
procedure before deciding whether they want to be bound by it,
which makes it difficult for the defendant to assess the financial
consequences of a settlement. Several authors therefore prefer an
opt-in in an early stage of the procedure.169 Again, from an economic
perspective an opt-in is evaluated critically due to the risk of rational
apathy. An opt-out procedure is preferred.
The proposal clearly entails a very active role for the court. It has to
evaluate if the representative organization really serves the interests
of the victims and not primarily of the organization itself, it has to
168 Whether the proposed criteria are clear enough and form a stricter test than in the current
situation is a matter that is being debated. See e.g. Stapel and Thuijs 2015, p. 188.
169 Van Duin and Lawant 2015, p. 14; Stapel and Thuijs 2015, p. 189. Arons and Koster 2014 are
more critical regarding the opt-in.
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avoid blackmail settlements, it has to induce parties to reach a settle-
ment and ultimately it might have to establish a scheme for collective
redress of the claim. This opens the question of whether society
might expect too much from judges in handling mass cases. Insights
from rational choice theory and from behavioral economics suggest
that this indeed is a realistic risk. I will not spend more attention on
that issue in this lecture, precisely because Alexandre Biard has
written his PhD thesis in the European Doctorate in Law and Econom-
ics on this topic.170
Whether or not the proposal sketches an economically optimal
procedure is a matter for further research. For example the above-
mentioned possibility of the court to require an opt-in before ruling
itself might be problematic due to rational apathy or free-riding
victims. In addition it is possible that the proposal introduces too
many procedural steps before the judge will rule himself, making
mass damages litigation more costly than necessary.171 Various
responses in the public consultation show that interested parties still
fear either blackmail settlements or rational apathy, or question
whether the proposed procedure is feasible for the courts.172 Hence,
subsequent research and debate should provide more insight into the
question whether the proposed procedure is a good way to deal with
mass damages. However, in my view it is clear that the proposal is an
improvement as compared to the current situation where mass
damages litigation is not possible in the first place.
170 Biard 2014. Also see Van Duin and Lawant 2015, p. 12.
171 Up to 55 procedural steps might have to be taken before the court establishes a scheme for
collective redress. See Van Duin and Lawant 2015, p. 10, who refer to the response of the
Raad van de Rechtspraak.
172 See e.g. the responses of the Raad voor de Rechtspraak, VNO-NCW en MKB-Nederland, the
Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten and the Consumentenbond on www.internetconsultatie.nl/
motiedijksma/reacties.
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6 Words of thanks and closing
After having discussed debated damages for over 40 minutes by now,
I want to conclude with some words of thanks. I would like to thank
the Board of the University, the Vereniging Trustfonds of the Eras-
mus University and the Erasmus School of Law for the trust they have
placed in me. I am thankful for the support I have received in this
respect from the former dean professor Maarten Kroeze, the current
dean professor Suzan Stoter, vice-dean professor Fabian Amtenbrink
and all the other people involved in my appointment. I thank the
Beadle’s Office for all the practical support they have given me in
preparing for today.
Support is also something I experience on a daily basis in the
Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, the RILE. In order to
avoid embarrassing or disappointing people, I will refrain from men-
tioning individuals by name, but I hope you all know that I am happy
to be your colleague, and that I appreciate all the support you give,
both professionally and personally.
I also want to thank my colleagues from the Erasmus University
and from other universities in general, and colleagues from the
research programme Behavioral Approaches to Contract and Tort
specifically for the stimulating environment they provide. I want to
thank Willem van Boom and Michael Faure for supporting my
appointment in their capacity as programme directors of the research
programme.
I thank my promoters, Roger Van den Bergh and Heico Kerkmees-
ter, for the guidance they gave me during my many, many years as a
PhD candidate, and for not abandoning all hope. The way in which
you have supervised me inspires me in my own supervision of PhD
candidates and if they appreciate my work, they should also thank
you.
Then the students, Dutch and international, on a bachelor, master
and PhD-level. Teaching and supervising you is a great pleasure, and
I learn a lot from you all. It is because of you that I often realize why I
like this job so much! The students of the mr.drs.-programma voor
economie en rechten deserve a special mention. I have been coordi-
nating this programme since it started many years ago, and I am
proud to see how successful you, the students, have made this
programme. I am moved to see graduated students, from the
mr.drs.-programma, the European Master in Law and Economics
(EMLE) and the European Doctorate in Law and Economics (EDLE)
in the audience. You have travelled long distances to be here with me
today and I appreciate that a lot.
Then my friends. It is great that there are friends here who I have
known since Kindergarten days, but also friends who I only met in
high school, university, or even later. It is sometimes said that one
gets to know a person by looking at his friends. Looking back at you
from this position, I can only say that I like what I see and I am glad
that you share this important day with me! I will not mention indi-
viduals here either, but I do want to thank everyone with whom I have
played in various bands for the many hours of fun.
I am happy that my family is here today. I am especially very glad
that my father and stepmother were able to make the long journey to
Rotterdam, because this day would not have been complete without
your presence. For the rest of my family, stepfamily and family in law,
I also refrain from mentioning people by name, because I am happy
with the presence of you all. However, I do want to briefly spend
attention to the family members who are no longer here. I think
about my mother, my brother Abel, my stepsister Marieke and my
stepniece Nienke. Four people who died much too young, and four
examples that make clear that no amount of money can truly com-
pensate the loss of a loved one. But that does not imply that we as
legal scholars could not and should not think about how to deal with
such difficult losses. I hope my work contributes a little to this end.
Then my children, Jeroen, Emma and Floortje. Thank you for
behaving so well during this long and boring story (with a little help
from tablet and smartphones). Thank you for the way in which you
show me every day again what is really important in life. Thank you
for providing the many examples which I can base upon you in my
lectures. I cannot tell you how much I enjoy talking about you at
work!
And finally Hanneke. I want to thank you for your presence here
today and for your presence in my life in the past 22 years. All other
things I want to say to you can wait for another time and another
place.
After these words of thanks, I have to deliver upon the promise I
made at the start of the lecture. I argued then that my lecture did not
entail ‘tragic choices’, but that it does involve scarce economic
resources, more specifically the time you have spent on listening to
me. A while ago I wrote a paper on the question whether ‘loss of time’
should be included in tort damages.173 I have argued there that it
indeed should be included and that one could assess the average non-
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pecuniary value of lost time at about e2.60 per hour. Given that I
have taken up your time for over 45 minutes by now, I owe you
damages of e2.00 per person. As a collective settlement, I propose to
pay this compensation in the form of drinks, in the hall outside.
Ik heb gezegd.
173 Visscher 2014.
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